

Government Exhibit 2A



Bates Numbers

001445-001464

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OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON

June 9, 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: JOHN HANNAH, ACTING PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT

SUBJECT: Information: CIA Paper on Purported Iraq-Niger Uranium Deal

Attached please find a CIA paper on the Iraq-Niger deal that was sent to us today. It is dated April 3, 2003. The paper was drafted as part of a Congressional Notification. We have also attached a New Yorker article by Sy Hersh on the issue, which we are reviewing.

Some of the highlights from the CIA paper include the following:

- On February 14, 2002, CIA wrote that "Information on the alleged uranium contract between Iraq and Niger comes exclusively from a foreign government service report that lacks crucial details, and we are working to clarify the information and to determine whether it can be corroborated." (Para 4)
- [REDACTED]
- According to the CIA paper, the first real indication that the CIA had serious concerns about the stream of reporting on Iraq-Niger does not occur until September 2002. According to the CIA paper, in the run-up to the September 24th publication of the British White Paper, CIA had "expressed concerns about the credibility of the reporting to the British [REDACTED] The paper claims that [REDACTED] "the British countered CIA concerns . . . by claiming they had corroborating evidence that Iraq sought uranium from Africa." According to the CIA, "This alleged corroborating information, however, was not shared with us." (Para 8)
- On the day the British White Paper was released, a "senior IC official" told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee "that his analysts rejected the idea that Iraq could obtain uranium from Niger, indicating they had concerns about the reporting." On October 4th, CIA officers told the Senate Intelligence Committee that the Iraq-Niger deal was one of two points on which the U.S. differed from the British assessment of Iraq's WMD. (Para 9)
- Nevertheless, the October 1st NIE on Iraq's WMD stated that "Iraq also began vigorously trying to procure uranium ore and yellowcake A foreign government service reported that as of early 2001, Niger planned to send several tons of 'pure uranium' to Iraq." The CIA

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paper explains that the reference to the Iraq-Niger deal was made in the NIE as part of "an effort to include all information related to Iraq's nuclear-weapon program." The paper points out that State/INR later in the NIE noted that "the claims of Iraqi pursuit of natural uranium in Africa are, in INR's assessment, highly dubious." (Para 10)

- On November 13, 2002, CIA told [REDACTED] "reporting on Iraqi attempts to procure uranium from Africa are fragmentary, at best . . . but it shows that Iraq is probably trying to acquire uranium ore abroad." (Para 13)
- On January 17, 2003 the CIA published a Senior Power Executive Intelligence Brief (SPWR). It is the last CIA analytical product referenced by the paper before the President's State of the Union address. The SPWR concludes that "Fragmentary reporting on Iraqi attempts to procure uranium from various countries in Africa in the past several years is another sign of reconstitution." (Para 19)
- On January 27, 2003 (2 days before the State of the Union), CIA issued a report [REDACTED] that [REDACTED] information related to discussions between Iraq and Niger dating from 1999 on a proposal to ship uranium." (Para 21)

Documents Pertaining to the Iraq-Niger Deal

Of special interest is the CIA's history in relation to the papers purporting to document the Iraq-Niger deal:

- On October 10th, 2002, U.S. Embassy Rome received from a journalist documents purporting to be copies of the Iraq-Niger [REDACTED] for uranium. CIA concluded that these were the documents that formed the basis for the February 2002 report [REDACTED] on the issue. (Para 11)
- Embassy Rome shared copies of the documents with the CIA [REDACTED] the Embassy forwarded the documents through State Department channels to its Bureau of Non-Proliferation." The CIA paper states that "the DI did not request or place a high-priority on obtaining the actual documents at this time, [REDACTED]"
- On October 15th, State/INR sent a message offering to provide CIA with copies of the documents at a meeting the following day. According to the CIA paper, "The delivery did not occur nor did CIA press State/INR for the documents". (Para 12)
- On January 12th and 13th, 2003 State/INR sent two messages to the CIA expressing concerns "that the documents pertaining to the Iraq-Niger deal were forgeries." Only at that point did a CIA officer conducting a review of the issue discover that the CIA did not have a copy of the documents. According to the paper, "The officer took steps to obtain the original [REDACTED] documents from State/INR, which occurred within days." (Para 18)

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- On February 4th, 2003, CIA sent a note to the U.S. Mission to the IAEA in Vienna and UNMOVIC in New York. The note contained copies of the original language documents of the Iraq-Niger deal. The note indicated that the information could be passed to the IAEA. Oddly, CIA states that this "was interpreted as permission to pass the original documents," which were in fact passed. (Para 24)
- On February 4-5, the U.S. briefed the IAEA on the Iraq-Niger deal. [REDACTED] briefing [REDACTED] claimed that "Two streams of reporting suggest Iraq has attempted to acquire uranium from Niger. We cannot confirm these reports Nonetheless, we are concerned that these reports may indicate Baghdad has attempted to secure an unreported source of uranium yellowcake". (Para 25)
- Not until February 7, 2003 did CIA receive the translated documents from State. According to the CIA paper, "Key forensic clues-errors in format and grammar contained in the original documents-were not conveyed in the translation process." (Para 27)
- On March 3, 2003, IAEA provided its analysis of the documents [REDACTED] concluding that they were forgeries. (Para 29) CIA analysis of the documents had not yet been completed. (Para 27)

Attachments

Tab A -- CIA Paper on Iraq-Niger Deal

Tab B -- New Yorker Article by Sy Hersh "Who Lied to Whom"

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TAB A

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Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

OCA 2003-1146

3 April 2003

Mr. Tim Sample
Staff Director
Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Tim:

SUBJECT: Notification

COUNTRY: Niger

ISSUE: [REDACTED] Purported Iraqi Attempt to get Uranium from Niger

(U) Enclosed is a background paper regarding the subject mentioned above.

(U) Should you have any questions regarding this matter, please do not hesitate to call.

Sincerely,


Stanley M. Moskowitz
Director of Congressional Affairs

Enclosure

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[REDACTED]
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SUBJECT: [REDACTED] Purported Iraqi attempt to get Uranium from Niger

1. [REDACTED] Most agencies in the Intelligence Community (IC) assess that multiple intelligence reports over the last few years on Saddam's aggressive pursuit of aluminum tubes for centrifuges, magnets for centrifuge bearings, high-speed balancing machines, and computer-controlled machine tools as well as the reconsolidation of his cadre of nuclear technicians point to ongoing reconstitution of his nuclear weapons program. In addition to these reports, the IC received a number of reports alleging that Iraq attempted to get uranium from several countries. The reports on attempted uranium procurement were not the essential elements underpinning our judgment that reconstitution had begun. This point is underscored by the fact that in more than a dozen briefings to Congress by senior officials last fall, the uranium acquisition attempts were not briefed. Because this issue has gained so much public attention, especially after the IAEA's public announcement that the Niger documents were forgeries, the chronology below lays out the key events starting with the dissemination of the initial [REDACTED] report on the topic in October 2001.

2. [REDACTED] On 15 October 2001, the CIA's Directorate of Operations issued a report [REDACTED] that indicated as of early 2001, Niger planned to send several tons of uranium to Iraq. The agreement for the sale of uranium to Iraq reportedly was approved by the state court of Niger in 2000. [REDACTED]

3. [REDACTED] On 5 February 2002, the Directorate of Operations issued a second report [REDACTED] indicating Niger and Iraq had signed an agreement regarding the sale of uranium in July 2000. [REDACTED]

4. [REDACTED] In response to the Directorate of Operations' report noted in paragraph three, CIA published a Senior Power Executive Intelligence Brief (SPWR) on 14 February 2002 that concluded, "Information on the alleged uranium contract between Iraq and Niger comes exclusively from a foreign government service report that lacks crucial details, and we are working to clarify the information and to determine whether it can be corroborated."

[REDACTED] The 14 February 2002 assessment erroneously stated the IAEA said Iraq already has some 550 tons of yellowcake—200 tons of which were purchased in 1978 from Niger. The correct figures are 199.9 tonnes of [REDACTED]

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5. [REDACTED] In early March 2002, the Directorate of Intelligence prepared an analytic update that reported on a meeting between the U.S. Ambassador to Niger, the Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the US European Command, and President Tandja of Niger. The update noted that in this late February 2002 meeting, President Tandja indicated that Niger was making all efforts to ensure that its uranium would be used only for peaceful purposes. We also reported that President Tandja had asked the US for unspecified assistance to ensure Niger's uranium did not fall into the wrong hands. Our analytic update also stated that we had requested additional information from the [REDACTED] service that provided the original reporting on this topic and that the service currently was unable to provide new information.

6. [REDACTED] On 8 March 2002, the Directorate of Operations disseminated information--obtained independently from a sensitive source--that indicated a former Nigerien government official claimed that since 1997, there had been no contracts signed between Niger and any rogue states for the sale of uranium in the form of yellowcake. While also asserting there had been no transfers of yellowcake to rogue states, one subsource--a former senior Nigerien official we are confident would have known of uranium sales--also said that he believed Iraq was interested in discussing yellowcake purchases when it sent a delegation to Niamey in mid-1999. The Directorate of Operations collected this information in an attempt to verify or refute, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] reporting on an alleged Iraq-Niger uranium deal. The Directorate of Operations assesses their sensitive source to be highly reliable [REDACTED]

The [REDACTED] subsources, however, were described in the disseminated report as knowing their remarks could reach the US Government and noted these individuals may have intended their comments to influence as well as inform.

uranium contained in 276.8 tonnes of uranium yellowcake, which were imported in the early 1980s. The precise year of import of this material is in question as the IAEA indicates Iraq received 432 barrels of yellowcake (137,435 kgs total) from Niger in 1981. It also lists that in 1982, Iraq received another 426 barrels of the material (139,409 kgs total) from Niger, bringing the total to 276.8 tonnes. The Iraqi declaration from 7 December 2002, however, indicates that two shipments of yellowcake occurred on 8 February 1981 and 18 March 1981. These are the same dates noted by Iraq in one section of its 1998 "Full Final and Complete Declaration" on its nuclear program. These discrepancies in dates have been flagged to the Department of State.

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7. [REDACTED] On 25 March 2002, the Directorate of Operations released the third and final report on the Iraq-Niger uranium issue [REDACTED]

8. [REDACTED] On 24 September 2002, the British Government published a dossier titled "Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction," which stated that "...there is intelligence that Iraq has sought the supply of significant quantities of uranium from Africa." CIA avoided making a similar reference in providing text for the U.S. White Paper entitled "Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs" and expressed concerns about the credibility of the reporting to the British [REDACTED] prior to publication of their assessment.

[REDACTED] prior to publication of the dossier, the British countered CIA concerns regarding credibility of the reporting by claiming they had corroborating evidence that Iraq sought uranium from Africa. This alleged corroborating information, however, was not shared with us. [REDACTED]

9. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] On 4 October 2002, while testifying before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, CIA officers were asked whether they agreed with the British dossier on Iraq's weapons programs. CIA's National Intelligence Officer for Strategic and Nuclear Programs referenced two points on which the US differed from the British: [REDACTED]

10. [REDACTED] On 1 October 2002, the National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq's WMD program was published. It stated: "Iraq has about 550 metric tons of yellowcake and low-enriched uranium at Tuwaitha, which is inspected annually by the IAEA. Iraq also began vigorously trying to procure uranium ore and yellowcake, acquiring either would shorten the time Baghdad needs to produce nuclear weapons. A foreign government service reported that as of early 2001, Niger planned to send several tons of 'pure uranium' (probably yellowcake) to Iraq. As of early 2001, Niger and Iraq reportedly were still working out arrangement for this deal, which could be for up to 500 tons of yellowcake. [REDACTED]"

[REDACTED] In an effort to include all information related to Iraq's nuclear-weapon program, reports of attempts to acquire uranium from abroad were included in the NIE, but not as one of the reasons that most agencies judged that

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Saddam was reconstituting his nuclear weapons program. In fact, State/INR noted later in the document that "the claims of Iraqi pursuit of natural uranium in Africa are, in INR's assessment, highly dubious."

11. [REDACTED] On 10 October 2002, Embassy Rome reported on a meeting from the previous day with a journalist from the Italian magazine *Panorama*. The journalist provided the Embassy with a copy of documents alleging Iraq and Niger had reached an agreement in July 2000 for the purchase of uranium. The journalist identified her source as an Italian male who had managed to obtain the documents in question and who was now seeking 15,000 Euro in return for their publication. Embassy Rome indicated that it had learned from CIA that the documents provided by the journalist were the subject of the CIA report issued on 5 February 2002, as described in paragraph three. Embassy Rome shared copies of the documents [REDACTED] which did not retain them because the Embassy forwarded the documents through State Department channels to its Bureau of Non-Proliferation (State/NP). The Directorate of Intelligence did not request or place a high-priority on obtaining the actual documents, at this time. [REDACTED]

12. [REDACTED] On 15 October 2002, an Intelligence Community E-mail (ICE-mail) from the Bureau of Intelligence and Research at the Department of State (State/INR) to CIA acknowledges receiving the documents acquired by Embassy Rome and noted doubt about the alleged uranium deal. State/INR also offered to provide copies of the documents to CIA at a meeting of the interagency group assigned to review nuclear export matters, occurring the next day. The delivery did not occur nor did CIA press State/INR for the documents, for the same reasons articulated in paragraph eleven.

13. [REDACTED] On 13 November 2002, as part of a larger briefing on the status of Iraq's nuclear weapons program, CIA briefed [REDACTED] "reporting on Iraqi attempts to procure uranium from Africa are fragmentary, at best. We assess that none of the deals have gone through, but it shows that Iraq is probably trying to acquire uranium ore abroad." Two additional points were provided which pointed to attempted uranium procurement from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DROC).

14. [REDACTED] On 22 November 2002, during a meeting at the State Department (INR), French Ministry of Foreign Affairs Director for Nonproliferation, Francois Richier, indicated France had drawn no conclusion about Iraqi nuclear reconstitution; and with one exception, the evidence available to France thus far was "dual-use." However, there was one thing "nuclear," France had information on an Iraqi attempt to buy uranium from Niger. Richier said France had investigated and determined that no uranium had been shipped. In response to a question from the

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Department of State as to whether France had confirmed that Iraq indeed had made this procurement attempt. Richier did not provide a direct response, but indicated that French officials believed this reporting to be true.

15. [REDACTED] On 25 November 2002, the US Naval Criminal Investigation Service in Marseille, France reported information from two of its sources who claimed that a large quantity of uranium was currently stored in barrels at the Port of Cotonou, Benin and that Niger's President had sold this material to Iraq.

16. [REDACTED] On 19 December 2002, the State Department released a fact sheet illustrating omissions from the Iraqi declaration to the UN Security Council, prepared by State/NP. Under the nuclear weapons section it stated, "The declaration ignores efforts to procure uranium from Niger. Why is the Iraqi regime hiding their uranium procurement?" During coordination, CIA confirmed that of all the reported incidences of Iraqi efforts to acquire uranium from abroad since 1991, we had the most information concerning the alleged deal with Niger, yet still considered the overall reporting as fragmentary. That day, the Weapons center for Intelligence, Non-Proliferation, and Arms Control (WINPAC) in the Directorate of Intelligence recommended that Niger not be mentioned, but according to the State officer who drafted the fact sheet, our comments were not obtained in time to correct the listing on the State Department web site. The information was acted on in time, however, to remove it from Ambassador Negroponte's statement.

17. [REDACTED] 6 January 2003 [REDACTED] IAEA's Iraq Nuclear Verification Office (INVO), INVO Director Jacques Baute raised the issue of uranium procurement attempts from Niger and requested that the U.S. provide any additional details regarding this supposed transaction. Baute added that INVO had not been provided with any particular details and, as in the past, asked for whatever information we could provide, however limited. In response, [REDACTED] began to review the reporting and analysis concerning the suspect Iraq-Niger Agreement [REDACTED]

18. [REDACTED] State/INR sent CIA two ICE-mail messages—one on 12 January and another on 13 January 2003—that expressed concerns that the documents pertaining to the Iraq-Niger deal were forgeries. In response, the WINPAC officer conducting a review of this issue discovered that CIA did not have a copy of those documents. The officer took steps to obtain the original [REDACTED] documents from State/INR, which occurred within days.

[REDACTED] CIA received this information from the US Navy through standard military/attaché channels, i.e., JIR service reporting.

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19. [REDACTED] A 17 January 2003 SPWR prepared in response to a request for additional evidence of Iraq's nuclear weapons program noted "Fragmentary reporting on Iraqi attempts to procure uranium from various countries in Africa in the past several years is another sign of reconstitution. Iraq has no legitimate use for uranium." Although CIA was re-examining this issue, this assessment reflected an extension of its previous analyses, because new data-such as a translation of the documents-had not yet arrived.

20. [REDACTED] In a 20 January 2003 [REDACTED] State/INR proposed adding points to the information [REDACTED] to be shared [REDACTED] on the Iraq-Niger uranium issue. The State/INR proposed talking points included details such as how the documents were acquired, but did not include any judgments concerning the authenticity of the documents. In the same message, State/INR also advocated that the actual documents obtained from Embassy Rome be passed to INVO. An exchange of [REDACTED] messages over the next few days shows [REDACTED] attempted to honor the State/INR requests. State/INR concurred in the final version of the talking points [REDACTED] which are described in more detail in paragraph twenty-five.

21. [REDACTED] January 2003, [REDACTED] issued a report [REDACTED] that noted that the presence of uranium is common in the port of Cotonou, Benin, as this is the terminus of the normal shipping route from Niger. [REDACTED] claimed [REDACTED] information related to discussions between Iraq and Niger dating from 1999 on a proposal to ship uranium. [REDACTED]

22. [REDACTED]

23. [REDACTED] On 29 January 2003, the President noted in the State of the Union address that, "the British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa."

24. [REDACTED] On 4 February 2003, a note from CIA/WINPAC was sent to [REDACTED] the US Mission to the IAEA in Vienna and the United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) office in New York. The note contained copies of the original language documents obtained by Embassy Rome. Instructions in that note indicated the

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in their document?* SECRET

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information could be passed to IAEA/INVO's Bauta, which was interpreted as permission to pass the original documents. As a result, the original documents were passed to UNMOVIC who passed them to INVO.

25. [REDACTED] On 4-5 February 2003, the U.S. briefed INVO in response to Bauta's request from 6 January for information on the alleged Iraq-Niger uranium agreement. Members of the US Mission to the IAEA in Vienna presented the information and analyses as compiled by CIA. This Intelligence Community-cleared briefing indicated, "Two streams of reporting suggest Iraq has attempted to acquire uranium from Niger. We cannot confirm these reports and have questions regarding some specific claims. Nonetheless, we are concerned that these reports may indicate Baghdad has attempted to secure an unreported source of uranium yellowcake for a nuclear weapons program." The two streams of reporting referred to in this briefing came from the sensitive source described in paragraph six of this notification [REDACTED]

26. [REDACTED] During Secretary Powell's briefing to the UN Security Council on 5 February 2003, he did not mention attempted Iraqi procurement of uranium due to CIA concerns raised during coordination regarding the veracity of the information on the alleged Iraq-Niger Agreement.

27. [REDACTED] CIA/WINPAC received the translated documents from the State Department on 7 February 2003. A preliminary examination of the document confirmed the identities of a key Iraqi [REDACTED] but did not progress sufficiently to fully examine other claims in the document. Key forensic clues--errors in format and grammar contained in the original documents--were not conveyed in the translation process.

28. [REDACTED] On 10 February 2003, a US Defense Attaché Officer reported that he had examined the warehouses, as described by the reporting in paragraph fifteen, and found they contained cotton rather than barrels of uranium bound for Iraq.

29. [REDACTED] On 3 March 2003, IAEA/INVO [REDACTED] an analysis of the 17-page document that the U.S. provided on this issue. INVO's review concluded that these documents were forgeries and did not substantiate any assessment that Iraq sought to buy uranium from Niger. The IAEA noted their assessment was also based on interviews in Iraq and discussions with officials from Niger. Copies of the IAEA's assessment arrived at CIA Headquarters on 10 March 2003.

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30. [REDACTED] On 4 March 2003, the US Mission to the IAEA in Vienna reported that "Baute explained that the French based their initial assessment on the same documents that the US provided and that after further review by the French, they appeared to be "embarrassed" by their initial assessment."

31. (U) On 7 March 2003, IAEA Director General El Baradei stated in his report to the UN Security Council that day that documents provided by member states indicating that Iraq sought to buy uranium from Niger in recent years are "not authentic." The IAEA concluded that these specific allegations were unfounded and promised to follow up if additional evidence were provided by member states.

32. [REDACTED] An 11 March 2003 SPWR and memo concluded that "We do not dispute the IAEA Director General's conclusion--last Friday before the UN Security Council--that documents on Iraq's agreement to buy uranium from Niger are not authentic."

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TAB B

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**Grand Jury
Exhibit 87**

**Bates Numbers
001472-001481**

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CLASSIFICATION

2003 JUN -9 PM 3:53

SITE 3
CIA
MESSAGE NUMBER 324

MONDAY
6-9-2003

TIME TRANSMITTED

15:47

TIME RECEIVED

FROM: [REDACTED]

Office/Desk:

Phone:

SUBJECT:

IRAQ - NIGER URANIUM (CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION)

DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS:

Pages:

10

(Including Cover)

NOTE: FURNISH AFTER-DUTY-HOURS CONTACT TELEPHONE NUMBER FOR EACH ADDRESSEE REQUIRING AFTER DUTY HOURS DELIVERY.



IMMEDIATE / URGENT



HOLD FOR NORMAL DUTY HOURS

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For Pickup

TRANSMITTED TO

AGENCY	RECIPIENT	OFFICE / ROOM NUMBER	PHONE NUMBER / SECURE FAX
W.H.	JENNY MAYFIELD	V.P.'S OFFICE	
(VIA SIT Room)		Room 276	
	PLEASE PASS TO		
	MR. HANNAH		
	+ MR. LIBBY		
	A.S.A.P.		
Remarks:	001472		

WASHFAX COVER SHEET

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Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

OCA 2003-1146
3 April 2003

Mr. Tim Sample
Staff Director
Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Tim:

SUBJECT: Notification


COUNTRY: Niger

ISSUE: [REDACTED] Purported Iraqi Attempt to get Uranium from Niger

(U) Enclosed is a background paper regarding the subject mentioned above.

(U) Should you have any questions regarding this matter, please do not hesitate to call.

Sincerely,


Stanley M. Moskowitz
Director of Congressional Affairs

Enclosure

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SUBJECT: [REDACTED] Purported Iraqi attempt to get Uranium from Niger

1. [REDACTED] Most agencies in the Intelligence Community (IC) assess that multiple intelligence reports over the last few years on Saddam's aggressive pursuit of aluminum tubes for centrifuges, magnets for centrifuge bearings, high-speed balancing machines, and computer-controlled machine tools as well as the reconsolidation of his cadre of nuclear technicians point to ongoing reconstitution of his nuclear weapons program. In addition to these reports, the IC received a number of reports alleging that Iraq attempted to get uranium from several countries. The reports on attempted uranium procurement were not the essential elements underpinning our judgment that reconstitution had begun. This point is underscored by the fact that in more than a dozen briefings to Congress by senior officials last fall, the uranium acquisition attempts were not briefed. Because this issue has gained so much public attention, especially after the IAEA's public announcement that the Niger documents were forgeries, the chronology below lays out the key events starting with the dissemination of the initial [REDACTED] report on the topic in October 2001.

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3. [REDACTED] On 5 February 2002, the Directorate of Operations issued a second report [REDACTED] indicating Niger and Iraq had signed an agreement regarding the sale of uranium in July 2000. [REDACTED]

4. [REDACTED] In response to the Directorate of Operations' report noted in paragraph three, CIA published a Senior Power Executive Intelligence Brief (SPWR) on 14 February 2002 that concluded, "Information on the alleged uranium contract between Iraq and Niger comes exclusively from a foreign government service report that lacks crucial details, and we are working to clarify the information and to determine whether it can be corroborated."

[REDACTED] The 14 February 2002 assessment erroneously stated the IAEA said Iraq already has some 550 tons of yellowcake—200 tons of which were purchased in 1978 from Niger. The correct figures are 199.9 tonnes of [REDACTED]

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5. [REDACTED] In early March 2002, the Directorate of Intelligence prepared an analytic update that reported on a meeting between the U.S. Ambassador to Niger, the Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the US European Command, and President Tandja of Niger. The update noted that in this late February 2002 meeting, President Tandja indicated that Niger was making all efforts to ensure that its uranium would be used only for peaceful purposes. We also reported that President Tandja had asked the US for unspecified assistance to ensure Niger's uranium did not fall into the wrong hands. Our analytic update also stated that we had requested additional information from the [REDACTED] service that provided the original reporting on this topic and that the service currently was unable to provide new information.

6. [REDACTED] On 8 March 2002, the Directorate of Operations disseminated information--obtained independently from a sensitive source--that indicated a former Nigerien government official claimed that since 1997, there had been no contracts signed between Niger and any rogue states for the sale of uranium in the form of yellowcake. While also asserting there had been no transfers of yellowcake to rogue states, one subsorce--a former senior Nigerien official we are confident would have known of uranium sales--also said that he believed Iraq was interested in discussing yellowcake purchases when it sent a delegation to Niamey in mid-1999. The Directorate of Operations collected this information in an attempt to verify or refute. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] reporting on an alleged Iraq-Niger uranium deal. The Directorate of Operations assesses their sensitive source to be highly reliable [REDACTED]

The [REDACTED] subsources, however, were described in the disseminated report as knowing their remarks could reach the US Government and noted these individuals may have intended their comments to influence as well as inform.

uranium contained in 276.8 tonnes of uranium yellowcake, which were imported in the early 1980s. The precise year of import of this material is in question as the IAEA indicates Iraq received 432 barrels of yellowcake (157,435 kgs total) from Niger in 1981. It also lists that in 1982, Iraq received another 426 barrels of the material (139,409 kgs total) from Niger, bringing the total to 276.8 tonnes. The Iraqi declaration from 7 December 2002, however, indicates that two shipments of yellowcake occurred on 8 February 1981 and 18 March 1981. These are the same dates noted by Iraq in one section of its 1998 "Full Final and Complete Declaration" on its nuclear program. These discrepancies in dates have been flagged to the Department of State.

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7. [REDACTED] On 25 March 2002, the Directorate of Operations released the third and final report on the Iraq-Niger uranium issue [REDACTED]

8. [REDACTED] On 24 September 2002, the British Government published a dossier titled "Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction," which stated that "there is intelligence that Iraq has sought the supply of significant quantities of uranium from Africa." CIA avoided making a similar reference in providing text for the U.S. White Paper entitled "Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs" and expressed concerns about the credibility of the reporting to the British [REDACTED] prior to publication of their assessment.

[REDACTED] prior to publication of the dossier, the British countered CIA concerns regarding credibility of the reporting by claiming they had corroborating evidence that Iraq sought uranium from Africa. This alleged corroborating information, however, was not shared with us. [REDACTED]

9. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] On 4 October 2002, while testifying before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, CIA officers were asked whether they agreed with the British dossier on Iraq's weapons programs. CIA's National Intelligence Officer for Strategic and Nuclear Programs referenced two points on which the US differed from the British: [REDACTED]

10. [REDACTED] On 1 October 2002, the National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq's WMD program was published. It stated: "Iraq has about 550 metric tons of yellowcake and low-enriched uranium at Tuwaitha, which is inspected annually by the IAEA. Iraq also began vigorously trying to procure uranium ore and yellowcake; acquiring either would shorten the time Baghdad needs to produce nuclear weapons. A foreign government service reported that as of early 2001, Niger planned to send several tons of 'pure uranium' (probably yellowcake) to Iraq. As of early 2001, Niger and Iraq reportedly were still working out arrangement for this deal, which could be for up to 500 tons of yellowcake. [REDACTED]"

[REDACTED] In an effort to include all information related to Iraq's nuclear-weapon program, reports of attempts to acquire uranium from abroad were included in the NIE, but not as one of the reasons that most agencies judged that

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Saddam was reconstituting his nuclear weapons program. In fact, State/INR noted later in the document that "the claims of Iraqi pursuit of natural uranium in Africa are, in INR's assessment, highly dubious."

11. [REDACTED] On 10 October 2002, Embassy Rome reported on a meeting from the previous day with a journalist from the Italian magazine *Panorama*. The journalist provided the Embassy with a copy of documents alleging Iraq and Niger had reached an agreement in July 2000 for the purchase of uranium. The journalist identified her source as an Italian male who had managed to obtain the documents in question and who was now seeking 15,000 Euro in return for their publication. Embassy Rome indicated that it had learned from CIA that the documents provided by the journalist were the subject of the CIA report issued on 5 February 2002, as described in paragraph three. Embassy Rome shared copies of the documents [REDACTED] which did not retain them because the Embassy forwarded the documents through State Department channels to its Bureau of Non-Proliferation (State/NP). The Directorate of Intelligence did not request or place a high-priority on obtaining the actual documents, at this time. [REDACTED]

12. [REDACTED] On 15 October 2002, an Intelligence Community E-mail (ICE-mail) from the Bureau of Intelligence and Research at the Department of State (State/INR) to CIA acknowledges receiving the documents acquired by Embassy Rome and noted doubt about the alleged uranium deal. State/INR also offered to provide copies of the documents to CIA at a meeting of the interagency group assigned to review nuclear export matters, occurring the next day. The delivery did not occur, nor did CIA press State/INR for the documents, for the same reasons articulated in paragraph eleven.

13. [REDACTED] On 13 November 2002, as part of a larger briefing on the status of Iraq's nuclear weapons program, CIA briefed [REDACTED] "reporting on Iraqi attempts to procure uranium from Africa are fragmentary, at best. We assess that none of the deals have gone through, but it shows that Iraq is probably trying to acquire uranium ore abroad." Two additional points were provided which pointed to attempted uranium procurement from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DROC).

14. [REDACTED] On 22 November 2002, during a meeting at the State Department (INR), French Ministry of Foreign Affairs Director for Nonproliferation, Francois Richier, indicated France had drawn no conclusion about Iraqi nuclear reconstitution; and with one exception, the evidence available to France thus far was "dual-use." However, there was one thing "nuclear," France had information on an Iraqi attempt to buy uranium from Niger. Richier said France had investigated and determined that no uranium had been shipped. In response to a question from the

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Department of State as to whether France had confirmed that Iraq indeed had made this procurement attempt. Richier did not provide a direct response, but indicated that French officials believed this reporting to be true.

15. [REDACTED] On 25 November 2002, the US Naval Criminal Investigation Service in Marseille, France reported information from two of its sources who claimed that a large quantity of uranium was currently stored in barrels at the Port of Cotonou, Benin and that Niger's President had sold this material to Iraq.

16. [REDACTED] On 19 December 2002, the State Department released a fact sheet illustrating omissions from the Iraqi declaration to the UN Security Council, prepared by State/NP. Under the nuclear weapons section it stated, "The declaration ignores efforts to procure uranium from Niger. Why is the Iraqi regime hiding their uranium procurement?" During coordination, CIA confirmed that of all the reported incidences of Iraqi efforts to acquire uranium from abroad since 1991, we had the most information concerning the alleged deal with Niger, yet still considered the overall reporting as fragmentary. That day, the Weapons center for Intelligence, Non-Proliferation, and Arms Control (WINPAC) in the Directorate of Intelligence recommended that Niger not be mentioned, but according to the State officer who drafted the fact sheet, our comments were not obtained in time to correct the listing on the State Department web site. The information was acted on in time, however, to remove it from Ambassador Negroponte's statement.

17. [REDACTED] a 6 January 2003 [REDACTED] IAEA's Iraq Nuclear Verification Office (INVO), INVO Director Jacques Baute raised the issue of uranium procurement attempts from Niger and requested that the U.S. provide any additional details regarding this supposed transaction. Baute added that INVO had not been provided with any particular details and, as in the past, asked for whatever information we could provide, however limited. In response, [REDACTED] began to review the reporting and analysis concerning the suspect Iraq-Niger Agreement [REDACTED]

18. [REDACTED] State/INR sent CIA two ICE-mail messages—one on 12 January and another on 13 January 2003—that expressed concerns that the documents pertaining to the Iraq-Niger deal were forgeries. In response, the WINPAC officer conducting a review of this issue discovered that CIA did not have a copy of those documents. The officer took steps to obtain the original [REDACTED] documents from State/INR, which occurred within days.

¹ [REDACTED] CIA received this information from the US Navy through standard military/attaché channels, i.e., JIR-series reporting.

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19. [REDACTED] A 17 January 2003 SPWR prepared in response to a request for additional evidence of Iraq's nuclear weapons program noted "Fragmentary reporting on Iraqi attempts to procure uranium from various countries in Africa in the past several years is another sign of reconstitution. Iraq has no legitimate use for uranium." Although CIA was re-examining this issue, this assessment reflected an extension of its previous analyses, because new data-such as a translation of the documents-had not yet arrived.

20. [REDACTED] In a 20 January 2003 [REDACTED] State/INR proposed adding points to the information [REDACTED] to be shared [REDACTED] on the Iraq-Niger uranium issue. The State/INR proposed talking points included details such as how the documents were acquired, but did not include any judgments concerning the authenticity of the documents. In the same message, State/INR also advocated that the actual documents obtained from Embassy Rome be passed to INVO. An exchange of [REDACTED] messages over the next few days shows [REDACTED] attempted to honor the State/INR requests. State/INR concurred in the final version of the talking points [REDACTED] which are described in more detail in paragraph twenty-five.

21. [REDACTED] January 2003, [REDACTED] issued a report [REDACTED] that noted that the presence of uranium is common in the port of Cotonou, Benin, as this is the terminus of the normal shipping route from Niger. [REDACTED] claimed [REDACTED] information related to discussions between Iraq and Niger dating from 1999 on a proposal to ship uranium. [REDACTED]

22. [REDACTED]

23. [REDACTED] On 29 January 2003, the President noted in the State of the Union address that, "the British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa."

24. [REDACTED] On 4 February 2003, a note from CIA/WINPAC was sent to [REDACTED] the US Mission to the IAEA in Vienna and the United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) office in New York. The note contained copies of the original language documents obtained by Embassy Rome. Instructions in that note indicated the

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information could be passed to IAEA/INVO's Baute, which was interpreted as permission to pass the original documents. As a result, the original documents were passed to UNMOVIC who passed them to INVO.

25. [REDACTED] On 4-5 February 2003, the U.S. briefed INVO in response to Baute's request from 6 January for information on the alleged Iraq-Niger uranium agreement. Members of the US Mission to the IAEA in Vienna presented the information and analyses as compiled by CIA. This Intelligence Community-cleared briefing indicated, "Two streams of reporting suggest Iraq has attempted to acquire uranium from Niger. We cannot confirm these reports and have questions regarding some specific claims. Nonetheless, we are concerned that these reports may indicate Baghdad has attempted to secure an unreported source of uranium yellowcake for a nuclear weapons program." The two streams of reporting referred to in this briefing came from the sensitive source described in paragraph six of this notification

[REDACTED]

26. [REDACTED] During Secretary Powell's briefing to the UN Security Council on 5 February 2003, he did not mention attempted Iraqi procurement of uranium due to CIA concerns raised during coordination regarding the veracity of the information on the alleged Iraq-Niger Agreement.

27. [REDACTED] CIA/WINPAC received the translated documents from the State Department on 7 February 2003. A preliminary examination of the document confirmed the identities of a key Iraqi [REDACTED] but did not progress sufficiently to fully examine other claims in the document. Key forensic clues--errors in format and grammar contained in the original documents--were not conveyed in the translation process.

28. [REDACTED] On 10 February 2003, a US Defense Attaché Officer reported that he had examined the warehouses, as described by the reporting in paragraph fifteen, and found they contained cotton rather than barrels of uranium bound for Iraq.

29. [REDACTED] On 3 March 2003, IAEA/INVO [REDACTED] an analysis of the 17-page document that the U.S. provided on this issue. INVO's review concluded that these documents were forgeries and did not substantiate any assessment that Iraq sought to buy uranium from Niger. The IAEA noted their assessment was also based on interviews in Iraq and discussions with officials from Niger. Copies of the IAEA's assessment arrived at CIA Headquarters on 10 March 2003.

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30. [REDACTED] On 4 March 2003, the US Mission to the IAEA in Vienna reported that "Baute explained that the French based their initial assessment on the same documents that the US provided and that after further review by the French, they appeared to be "embarrassed" by their initial assessment."

31. (U) On 7 March 2003, IAEA Director General El Baradei stated in his report to the UN Security Council that day that documents provided by member states indicating that Iraq sought to buy uranium from Niger in recent years are "not authentic." The IAEA concluded that these specific allegations were unfounded and promised to follow up if additional evidence were provided by member states.

32. [REDACTED] An 11 March 2003 SPWR and memo concluded that "We do not dispute the IAEA Director General's conclusion-last Friday before the UN Security Council-that documents on Iraq's agreement to buy uranium from Niger are not authentic."

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Bates Numbers

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*Prepared by CIA
received 7/12/03*

Purported Iraqi Attempt to Get Uranium From Niger [REDACTED]

1. [REDACTED] Most agencies in the Intelligence Community (IC) assess that multiple intelligence reports over the last few years on Saddam's aggressive pursuit of aluminum tubes for centrifuges, magnets for centrifuge bearings, high-speed balancing machines, and computer-controlled machine tools as well as the reconsolidation of his cadre of nuclear technicians point to ongoing reconstitution of his nuclear weapons program. In addition to these reports, the IC received a number of reports alleging that Iraq attempted to get uranium from several countries. The reports on attempted uranium procurement were not the essential elements underpinning our judgment that reconstitution had begun. This point is underscored by the fact that in more than a dozen briefings to Congress by senior officials last fall, the uranium acquisition attempts were not briefed. Because this issue has gained so much public attention, especially after the IAEA's public announcement that the Niger documents were forgeries, the chronology below lays out the key events starting with the dissemination of the initial [REDACTED] report on the topic in October 2001.

2. [REDACTED] On 15 October 2001, the CIA's Directorate of Operations issued a report [REDACTED] that indicated as of early 2001, Niger planned to send several tons of uranium to Iraq. The agreement for the sale of uranium to Iraq reportedly was approved by the state court of Niger in 2000. [REDACTED]

3. [REDACTED] On 5 February 2002, the Directorate of Operations issued a second report [REDACTED] indicating Niger and Iraq had signed an agreement regarding the sale of uranium in July 2000. [REDACTED]

4. [REDACTED] In response to the Directorate of Operations' report noted in paragraph three, CIA published a Senior Power Executive Intelligence Brief (SPWR) on 14 February 2002 that concluded, "Information on the alleged uranium contract between Iraq and Niger comes exclusively from a foreign government service report that lacks crucial details, and we are working to clarify the information and to determine whether it can be corroborated."¹

¹ [REDACTED] The 14 February 2002 assessment erroneously stated the IAEA said Iraq already has some 550 tons of yellowcake—200 tons of which were purchased in 1978 from Niger. The correct figures are 199.9 tonnes of uranium contained in 276.8 tonnes of uranium yellowcake, which were imported in the early 1980s. The precise year of import of this material is in question as the IAEA indicates Iraq received 432 barrels of yellowcake (137,435 kgs total) from Niger in 1981. It also lists that in 1982, Iraq received another 426 barrels of the material (139,409 kgs total) from Niger, bringing the total to 276.8 tonnes. The Iraqi declaration from 7 December 2002, however, indicates that two shipments of yellowcake occurred on 8 February 1981 and 18 March 1981. These are the same

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5. [REDACTED] In early March 2002, the Directorate of Intelligence prepared an analytic update (an e-mail to intelligence briefer) that reported on a meeting between the U.S. Ambassador to Niger, the Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the US European Command, and President Tandja of Niger. The update noted that in this late February 2002 meeting, President Tandja indicated that Niger was making all efforts to ensure that its uranium would be used only for peaceful purposes. We also reported that President Tandja had asked the US for unspecified assistance to ensure Niger's uranium did not fall into the wrong hands. Our analytic update also stated that we had requested additional information from the [REDACTED] service that provided the original reporting on this topic and that the service currently was unable to provide new information.

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6. [REDACTED] On 8 March 2002, the Directorate of Operations disseminated information--obtained independently from a sensitive source--that indicated a former Nigerien government official claimed that since 1997, there had been no contracts signed between Niger and any rogue states for the sale of uranium in the form of yellowcake. While also asserting there had been no transfers of yellowcake to rogue states, one subsource--a former senior Nigerien official we are confident would have known of uranium sales--also said that he believed Iraq was interested in discussing yellowcake purchases when it sent a delegation to Niamey in mid-1999. The Directorate of Operations collected this information in an attempt to verify or refute, [REDACTED] reporting on an alleged Iraq-Niger uranium deal. The Directorate of Operations assesses their sensitive source to be highly reliable [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The subsources, however, were described in the disseminated report as knowing their remarks could reach the US Government and noted these individuals may have intended their comments to influence as well as inform.

7. [REDACTED] On 25 March 2002, the Directorate of Operations released the third and final report on the Iraq-Niger uranium issue [REDACTED]

8. [REDACTED] On 24 September 2002, the British Government published a dossier titled "Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction," which stated that "...there is intelligence that Iraq has sought the supply of significant quantities of uranium from Africa." CIA avoided making a similar reference in providing text for the U.S. White Paper entitled "Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs" and expressed concerns about the credibility of the reporting to the British [REDACTED] prior to publication of their assessment. [REDACTED] prior to publication of the dossier, the British countered CIA concerns regarding credibility of the reporting by claiming they had corroborating evidence that Iraq sought uranium from Africa. This alleged corroborating information, however, was not shared with us. [REDACTED]

dates noted by Iraq in one section of its 1998 "Full Final and Complete Declaration" on its nuclear program. These discrepancies in dates have been flagged to the Department of State.

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9. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] On 4 October 2002, while testifying before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, CIA officers were asked whether they agreed with the British dossier on Iraq's weapons programs. CIA's National Intelligence Officer for Strategic and Nuclear Programs referenced two points on which the US differed from the British: [REDACTED]

10. [REDACTED] On 1 October 2002, the National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq's WMD program was published. It stated: "Iraq has about 550 metric tons of yellowcake and low-enriched uranium at Tuwaitha, which is inspected annually by the IAEA. Iraq also began vigorously trying to procure uranium ore and yellowcake; acquiring either would shorten the time Baghdad need to produce nuclear weapons. A foreign government service reported that as of early 2001, Niger planned to send several tons of 'pure uranium' (probably yellowcake) to Iraq. As of early 2001, Niger and Iraq reportedly were still working out arrangement for this deal, which could be for up to 500 tons of yellowcake. [REDACTED]"

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12. [REDACTED] On 15 October 2002, an Intelligence Community E-mail (ICE-mail) from the Bureau of Intelligence and Research at the Department of State (State/INR) to CIA acknowledges receiving the documents acquired by Embassy Rome and noted doubt about the alleged uranium deal. State/INR also offered to provide copies of the documents to CIA at a meeting of the interagency group assigned to reviews nuclear export matters, occurring the next day. The delivery did not occur nor did CIA press State/INR for the documents, for the same reasons articulated in paragraph eleven.

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² CIA received this information from the US Navy through standard military/attaché channels, i.e., IIR-series reporting.

18. State/INR sent CIA two ICE-mail messages—one on 12 January and another on 13 January 2003—that expressed concerns that the documents pertaining to the Iraq-Niger deal were forgeries. In response, the WINPAC officer conducting a review of this issue discovered that CIA did not have a copy of those documents. The officer took steps to obtain the original [REDACTED] documents from State/INR, which occurred within days.

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23. [REDACTED] On 29 January 2003, the President noted in the State of the Union address that, "...the British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa."

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25. [REDACTED] On 4-5 February 2003, the U.S. briefed INVO in response to Baute's request from 6 January for information on the alleged Iraq-Niger uranium agreement. Members of the US Mission to the IAEA in Vienna presented the information and analyses as compiled by CIA. This Intelligence Community-cleared briefing indicated, "Two streams of reporting suggest Iraq has attempted to acquire uranium from Niger. We cannot confirm these reports and have questions regarding some specific claims. Nonetheless, we are concerned that these reports may indicate Baghdad has attempted to secure an unreported source of uranium yellowcake for a nuclear weapons program." The two streams of reporting referred to in this briefing came from the sensitive source described in paragraph six of this notification [REDACTED]

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31. (U) On 7 March 2003, IAEA Director General El Baradei stated in his report to the UN Security Council that day that documents provided by member states indicating that Iraq sought to buy uranium from Niger in recent years are "not authentic." The IAEA concluded that these specific allegations were unfounded and promised to follow up if additional evidence were provided by member states.

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32. [REDACTED] An 11 March 2003 SPWR and memo concluded that "We do not dispute the IAEA Director General's conclusion—last Friday before the UN Security Council—that documents on Iraq's agreement to buy uranium from Niger are not authentic."

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Bates Numbers

001552 & 001553

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Wilson

NIGERIEN DENIAL OF URANIUM YELLOWCAKE
SALES TO ROGUE STATES

SOURCE: A CONTACT WITH EXCELLENT ACCESS WHO DOES NOT HAVE AN
ESTABLISHED REPORTING RECORD. (SENSITIVE CONTACT)

TEXT: 1. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: THE SUBSOURCES OF THE FOLLOWING
INFORMATION KNEW THEIR REMARKS COULD REACH THE U.S. GOVERNMENT AND
MAY HAVE INTENDED TO INFLUENCE AS WELL AS INFORM.) FORMER NIGERIEN
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS CLAIMED THAT SINCE 1997 THERE HAD BEEN NO
CONTRACTS SIGNED BETWEEN NIGER AND ANY ROGUE STATES FOR THE SALE OF
URANIUM IN THE FORM OF YELLOWCAKE. THE FORMER OFFICIALS ALSO
ASSERTED THERE HAD BEEN NO TRANSFERS OF YELLOWCAKE TO ROGUE STATES.

2. FORMER NIGERIEN PRIME MINISTER IBRAHIM ((MAYAKI)), WHO WAS
NIGER'S FOREIGN MINISTER FROM 1996-1997 AND NIGER'S PRIME MINISTER
FROM 1997-1999 AND WHO MAINTAINED CLOSE TIES TO THE CURRENT NIGERIEN
GOVERNMENT, STATED HE WAS UNAWARE OF ANY CONTRACTS BEING SIGNED
BETWEEN NIGER AND ROGUE STATES FOR THE SALE OF YELLOWCAKE DURING HIS
TENURE AS BOTH FOREIGN MINISTER AND PRIME MINISTER. MAYAKI, HOWEVER,
DID RELATE THAT IN JUNE 1999 BARKA ((TEFRIDJ)), A NIGERIEN/ALGERIAN
BUSINESSMAN, APPROACHED HIM AND INSISTED THAT MAYAKI MEET WITH AN
IRAQI DELEGATION TO DISCUSS "EXPANDING COMMERCIAL RELATIONS" BETWEEN
NIGER AND IRAQ. ALTHOUGH THE MEETING TOOK PLACE, MAYAKI LET THE
MATTER DROP DUE TO THE UNITED NATIONS (UN) SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAQ AND
THE FACT THAT HE OPPOSED DOING BUSINESS WITH IRAQ. MAYAKI SAID THAT
HE INTERPRETED THE PHRASE "EXPANDING COMMERCIAL RELATIONS" TO MEAN
THAT IRAQ WANTED TO DISCUSS URANIUM YELLOWCAKE SALES. MAYAKI SAID HE
UNDERSTOOD ROGUE STATES WOULD LIKE TO EXPLOIT NIGER'S RESOURCES,
SPECIFICALLY URANIUM, BUT HE BELIEVED THE NIGERIEN GOVERNMENT'S
REGARD FOR THE UNITED STATES (U.S.) AS A CLOSE ALLY WOULD PREVENT
SALES TO THESE STATES FROM TAKING PLACE DESPITE NIGER'S ECONOMIC
WOES. MAYAKI CLAIMED THAT IF THERE HAD BEEN ANY CONTRACTS FOR
YELLOWCAKE BETWEEN NIGER AND ANY ROGUE STATE DURING HIS TENURE, HE
WOULD HAVE SEEN THE CONTRACT.

3. BOUCAR ((MAI MANGA)), NIGER'S FORMER MINISTER OF ENERGY AND
MINES UNTIL 9 APRIL 1999, A FORMER DIRECTOR OF THE NIGERIEN COMENAC
MINE AND CURRENTLY HONORARY PRESIDENT OF COMENAC, STATED THAT THERE
WERE NO SALES OUTSIDE OF INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (IAEA)
CHANNELS SINCE THE MID-1980S. MAI MANGA SAID THAT HE KNEW OF NO
CONTRACTS SIGNED BETWEEN NIGER AND ANY ROGUE STATE FOR THE SALE OF
URANIUM. HE ADMITTED THAT YEARS AGO A PAKISTANI DELEGATION VISITED
NIGER AND OFFERED TO PURCHASE URANIUM BUT THAT NO SALES RESULTED FROM

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THESE TALKS. MAI MANGA ALSO SAID THAT (FNU) ((BLASCHER)), THE FORMER DIRECTOR GENERAL OF SOMAIR AND CURRENTLY A DIRECTOR AT COGEMA, CAME TO HIM IN 1998 WITH AN IRANIAN DELEGATION TO DISCUSS BUYING 400 TONS OF YELLOWCAKE FROM NIGER; HOWEVER, THE ONLY RESULT WAS A MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION, WITH NO CONTRACT BEING SIGNED AND NO YELLOWCAKE TRANSFERRED TO IRAN. MAI MANGA THEORIZED THAT NIGER'S MINES COULD HAVE INCREASED PRODUCTION TO SUPPLY IRAN WITH THIS AMOUNT OF YELLOWCAKE BUT THIS WOULD HAVE REQUIRED OPENING ADDITIONAL MINING FACILITIES THAT HAVE BEEN MOTHBALLED FOR SEVERAL YEARS. MAI MANGA THEREFORE CONCLUDED THAT A SALE TO A ROGUE STATE SUCH AS IRAN WOULD HAVE BEEN DIFFICULT GIVEN THE NEED OPEN MORE FACILITIES. (SOURCE COMMENT: MAI MANGA APPEARED TO REGRET THAT NIGER EVEN DISCUSSED URANIUM SALES WITH IRAN IN LIGHT OF THE INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE THAT RESULTED.)

4. MAI MANGA STATED THAT URANIUM FROM NIGER'S MINES IS VERY TIGHTLY CONTROLLED AND ACCOUNTED FOR FROM THE TIME IT IS MINED UNTIL THE TIME IS LOADED ONTO SHIPS AT THE PORT OF COTONOU, BENIN. ACCORDING TO MAI MANGA, EVEN A KILOGRAM OF URANIUM WOULD BE NOTICED MISSING AT THE MINES. ON-SITE STORAGE IS LIMITED AND HE SAID THAT EACH SHIPMENT OF URANIUM IS UNDER NIGERIEAN ARMED MILITARY ESCORT FROM THE TIME IT LEAVES ONE OF THE TWO NIGERIEAN MINES UNTIL IT IS LOADED ON TO A SHIP IN COTONOU. AIR TRANSPORT IS TOO EXPENSIVE TO SHIP YELLOWCAKE AND TRUCKING BARRELS OF YELLOWCAKE NORTHWARD WOULD REQUIRE AN EXPERIENCED GUIDE AND MANY ARMED GUARDS, DUE TO THE SHIFTING DUNES AND BANDITS IN THAT REGION. MAI MANGA THEREFORE BELIEVED THAT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT, IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE, TO ARRANGE A SPECIAL SHIPMENT OF URANIUM TO A PARIAS STATE GIVEN THESE STRICT CONTROLS AND THE CLOSE MONITORING BY THE NIGERIEAN GOVERNMENT AND THE TWO MINING COMPANIES. MAI MANGA ALSO SAID THAT THE MINE AND YELLOWCAKE WORKERS ARE TOLD THAT URANIUM IS DANGEROUS SO THEY DON'T KNOW HOW TO HANDLE THE MATERIAL OUTSIDE OF THE STANDARD PROCEDURES.

5. MAI MANGA PROVIDED AN OVERVIEW OF THE TWO URANIUM MINES IN NIGER, SOMAIR AND COMENAC. SOMAIR IS AN OPEN PIT MINE THAT PRODUCES ROUGHLY 1000 TONS OF YELLOWCAKE PER YEAR. THIS HAS BEEN THE AMOUNT PRODUCED FOR YEARS AT THIS MINE WHICH IS JOINTLY OWNED BY FRANCE AND NIGER. COMENAC IS AN UNDERGROUND MINE THAT PRODUCES ROUGHLY 2000 TONS OF YELLOWCAKE PER YEAR. THIS MINE IS JOINTLY OWNED BY FRANCE, JAPAN, SPAIN AND NIGER. IN THE EARLY 1980S THE COMBINED OUTPUT WAS INCREASED FROM 3000 TONS TO NEARLY 4000 TONS OF YELLOWCAKE PER YEAR, BUT PRODUCTION WAS CUT IN THE 1980S WHEN THE URANIUM PRICE FELL AND SEVERAL YELLOWCAKE PRODUCTION LINES WERE MOTHBALLED AND HAVE YET TO RESTART. NIGER DOES NOT TAKE ITS OWN PERCENTAGE OF THE PRODUCT; ALL THE YELLOWCAKE IS SHIPPED TO FRANCE, JAPAN OR SPAIN. FRANCE'S COGEMA OVERSEES THE PRODUCTION FROM BOTH MINES AND SETS THE PRODUCTION SCHEDULE ALONG WITH THE MINE MANAGEMENT, FIRST FOR THE YEAR AND THEN BREAKING THE PRODUCTION INTO MONTHLY TARGETS. PRODUCTION IS ADJUSTED DEPENDING ON THE URANIUM YIELD FROM THE MINE ORE. ADDITIONALLY, FRANCE CONTROLS THE FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF THE MINES BECAUSE URANIUM IS PRICED IN U.S. DOLLARS ON THE WORLD MARKET, BUT NIGER'S CONTRACTS WITH COGEMA ARE IN CFAS. WHEN THE CFA WAS DEVALUED, THIS EFFECTIVELY CUT THE PRICE IN HALF--A CHRONIC SOURCE OF FRICTION BETWEEN FRANCE AND NIGER.



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Bates Numbers

001588-001590

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SALES TO ROGUE STATES

[REDACTED] TO EARLY MARCH 2002

Joe Wilson

SOURCE: A CONTACT WITH EXCELLENT ACCESS WHO DOES NOT HAVE AN ESTABLISHED REPORTING RECORD. (SENSITIVE CONTACT)

[REDACTED]

TEXT: 1. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: THE SUBSOURCES OF THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION KNEW THEIR REMARKS COULD REACH THE U.S. GOVERNMENT AND MAY HAVE INTENDED TO INFLUENCE AS WELL AS INFORM.) FORMER NIGERIAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS CLAIMED THAT SINCE 1997 THERE HAD BEEN NO CONTRACTS SIGNED BETWEEN NIGER AND ANY ROGUE STATES FOR THE SALE OF URANIUM IN THE FORM OF YELLOWCAKE. THE FORMER OFFICIALS ALSO ASSERTED THERE HAD BEEN NO TRANSFERS OF YELLOWCAKE TO ROGUE STATES.

[REDACTED]

2. FORMER NIGERIAN PRIME MINISTER IBRAHIM ((MAYAKI)), WHO WAS NIGER'S FOREIGN MINISTER FROM 1996-1997 AND NIGER'S PRIME MINISTER FROM 1997-1999 AND WHO MAINTAINED CLOSE TIES TO THE CURRENT NIGERIAN GOVERNMENT, STATED HE WAS UNAWARE OF ANY CONTRACTS BEING SIGNED BETWEEN NIGER AND ROGUE STATES FOR THE SALE OF YELLOWCAKE DURING HIS TENURE AS BOTH FOREIGN MINISTER AND PRIME MINISTER. MAYAKI, HOWEVER, DID RELATE THAT IN JUNE 1999 BARKA ((TEFRIDJ)), A NIGERIAN/ALGERIAN BUSINESSMAN, APPROACHED HIM AND INSISTED THAT MAYAKI MEET WITH AN IRAQI DELEGATION TO DISCUSS "EXPANDING COMMERCIAL RELATIONS" BETWEEN NIGER AND IRAQ. ALTHOUGH THE MEETING TOOK PLACE, MAYAKI LET THE MATTER DROP DUE TO THE UNITED NATIONS (UN) SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAQ AND THE FACT THAT HE OPPOSED DOING BUSINESS WITH IRAQ. MAYAKI SAID THAT HE INTERPRETED THE PHRASE "EXPANDING COMMERCIAL RELATIONS" TO MEAN THAT IRAQ WANTED TO DISCUSS URANIUM YELLOWCAKE SALES. MAYAKI SAID HE UNDERSTOOD ROGUE STATES WOULD LIKE TO EXPLOIT NIGER'S RESOURCES, SPECIFICALLY URANIUM, BUT HE BELIEVED THE NIGERIAN GOVERNMENT'S REGARD FOR THE UNITED STATES (U.S.) AS A CLOSE ALLY WOULD PREVENT SALES TO THESE STATES FROM TAKING PLACE DESPITE NIGER'S ECONOMIC WOES. MAYAKI CLAIMED THAT IF THERE HAD BEEN ANY CONTRACTS FOR

[REDACTED]

YELLOWCAKE BETWEEN NIGER AND ANY ROGUE STATE DURING HIS TENURE, HE WOULD HAVE SEEN THE CONTRACT.

3. BOUCAR ((MAI MANGA)), NIGER'S FORMER MINISTER OF ENERGY AND MINES UNTIL 9 APRIL 1999, A FORMER DIRECTOR OF THE NIGERIAN COMENAC MINE AND CURRENTLY HONORARY PRESIDENT OF COMENAC, STATED THAT THERE WERE NO SALES OUTSIDE OF INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (IAEA) CHANNELS SINCE THE MID-1980S. MAI MANGA SAID THAT HE KNEW OF NO CONTRACTS SIGNED BETWEEN NIGER AND ANY ROGUE STATE FOR THE SALE OF URANIUM. HE ADMITTED THAT YEARS AGO A PAKISTANI DELEGATION VISITED NIGER AND OFFERED TO PURCHASE URANIUM BUT THAT NO SALES RESULTED FROM THESE TALKS. MAI MANGA ALSO SAID THAT ((FNU)) ((BLASCHER)) THE FORMER

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DIRECTOR GENERAL OF SOMAIR AND CURRENTLY A DIRECTOR AT COGEMA. CAME TO HIM IN 1998 WITH AN IRANIAN DELEGATION TO DISCUSS BUYING 400 TONS OF YELLOWCAKE FROM NIGER; HOWEVER, THE ONLY RESULT WAS A MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION, WITH NO CONTRACT BEING SIGNED AND NO YELLOWCAKE TRANSFERRED TO IRAN. MAI MANGA THEORIZED THAT NIGER'S MINES COULD HAVE INCREASED PRODUCTION TO SUPPLY IRAN WITH THIS AMOUNT OF YELLOWCAKE BUT THIS WOULD HAVE REQUIRED OPENING ADDITIONAL MINING FACILITIES THAT HAVE BEEN MOTHBALLED FOR SEVERAL YEARS. MAI MANGA

THEREFORE CONCLUDED THAT A SALE TO A ROGUE STATE SUCH AS IRAN WOULD HAVE BEEN DIFFICULT GIVEN THE NEED OPEN MORE FACILITIES. (SOURCE COMMENT: MAI MANGA APPEARED TO REGRET THAT NIGER EVEN DISCUSSED URANIUM SALES WITH IRAN IN LIGHT OF THE INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE THAT RESULTED.)

4. MAI MANGA STATED THAT URANIUM FROM NIGER'S MINES IS VERY TIGHTLY CONTROLLED AND ACCOUNTED FOR FROM THE TIME IT IS MINED UNTIL THE TIME IS LOADED ONTO SHIPS AT THE PORT OF COTONOU, BENIN. ACCORDING TO MAI MANGA, EVEN A KILOGRAM OF URANIUM WOULD BE NOTICED MISSING AT THE MINES. ON-SITE STORAGE IS LIMITED AND HE SAID THAT EACH SHIPMENT OF URANIUM IS UNDER NIGERIAN ARMED MILITARY ESCORT FROM THE TIME IT LEAVES ONE OF THE TWO NIGERIAN MINES UNTIL IT IS LOADED ON TO A SHIP IN COTONOU. AIR TRANSPORT IS TOO EXPENSIVE TO SHIP YELLOWCAKE AND TRUCKING BARRELS OF YELLOWCAKE NORTHWARD WOULD REQUIRE AN EXPERIENCED GUIDE AND MANY ARMED GUARDS, DUE TO THE SHIFTING DUNES AND BANDITS IN THAT REGION. MAI MANGA THEREFORE BELIEVED THAT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT, IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE, TO ARRANGE A SPECIAL SHIPMENT OF URANIUM TO A PARIAS STATE GIVEN THESE STRICT CONTROLS AND THE CLOSE MONITORING BY THE NIGERIAN GOVERNMENT AND THE TWO MINING

COMPANIES. MAI MANGA ALSO SAID THAT THE NIGER AND YELLOWCAKE WORKERS ARE TOLD THAT URANIUM IS DANGEROUS SO THEY DON'T KNOW HOW TO HANDLE THE MATERIAL OUTSIDE OF THE STANDARD PROCEDURES.

5. MAI MANGA PROVIDED AN OVERVIEW OF THE TWO URANIUM MINES IN NIGER, SOMAIR AND COMENAC. SOMAIR IS AN OPEN PIT MINE THAT PRODUCES ROUGHLY 1000 TONS OF YELLOWCAKE PER YEAR. THIS HAS BEEN THE AMOUNT PRODUCED FOR YEARS AT THIS MINE WHICH IS JOINTLY OWNED BY FRANCE AND NIGER. COMENAC IS AN UNDERGROUND MINE THAT PRODUCES ROUGHLY 2000 TONS OF YELLOWCAKE PER YEAR. THIS MINE IS JOINTLY OWNED BY FRANCE, JAPAN, SPAIN AND NIGER. IN THE EARLY 1980S THE COMBINED OUTPUT WAS INCREASED FROM 3000 TONS TO NEARLY 4000 TONS OF YELLOWCAKE PER YEAR. BUT PRODUCTION WAS CUT IN THE 1980S WHEN THE URANIUM PRICE FELL AND SEVERAL YELLOWCAKE PRODUCTION LINES WERE MOTHBALLED AND HAVE YET TO RESTART. NIGER DOES NOT TAKE ITS OWN PERCENTAGE OF THE PRODUCT; ALL THE YELLOWCAKE IS SHIPPED TO FRANCE, JAPAN OR SPAIN. FRANCE'S COGEMA OVERSEES THE PRODUCTION FROM BOTH MINES AND SETS THE PRODUCTION SCHEDULE ALONG WITH THE MINE MANAGEMENT, FIRST FOR THE YEAR AND THEN BREAKING THE PRODUCTION INTO MONTHLY TARGETS. PRODUCTION IS ADJUSTED

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DEPENDING ON THE URANIUM YIELD FROM THE MINE ORE. ADDITIONALLY,

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]
FINAL SECTION OF 2

[REDACTED]

FRANCE CONTROLS THE FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF THE MINES BECAUSE URANIUM IS PRICED IN U.S. DOLLARS ON THE WORLD MARKET, BUT NIGER'S CONTRACTS WITH COGEMA ARE IN CFAS. WHEN THE CFA WAS DEVALUED, THIS EFFECTIVELY CUT THE PRICE IN HALF--A CHRONIC SOURCE OF FRICTION BETWEEN FRANCE AND NIGER.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

ACQ: (EARLY MARCH 2002).

[REDACTED]

WARNING: REPORT CLASS-SECRET- [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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LL010-10548

Bates Numbers

001783-001790

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SUBJECT: [REDACTED] Purported Iraqi Attempt to get Uranium from Niger

1. [REDACTED] Most agencies in the Intelligence Community (IC) assess that multiple intelligence reports over the last few years on Saddam's aggressive pursuit of aluminum tubes for centrifuges, magnets for centrifuge bearings, high-speed balancing machines, and computer-controlled machine tools as well as the reconsolidation of his cadre of nuclear technicians point to ongoing reconstitution of his nuclear weapons program. In addition to these reports, the IC received a number of reports alleging that Iraq attempted to get uranium from several countries. The reports on attempted uranium procurement were not the essential elements underpinning our judgment that reconstitution had begun. This point is underscored by the fact that in more than a dozen briefings to Congress by senior officials last fall, the uranium acquisition attempts were not briefed. Because this issue has gained so much public attention, especially after the IAEA's public announcement that the Niger documents were forgeries, the chronology below lays out the key events starting with the dissemination of the initial [REDACTED] report on the topic in October 2001.

2. [REDACTED] On 15 October 2001, the CIA's Directorate of Operations issued a report [REDACTED] that indicated as of early 2001, Niger planned to send several tons of uranium to Iraq. The agreement for the sale of uranium to Iraq reportedly was approved by the state court of Niger in 2000. [REDACTED]

3. [REDACTED] On 5 February 2002, the Directorate of Operations issued a second report [REDACTED] indicating Niger and Iraq had signed an agreement regarding the sale of uranium in July 2000. [REDACTED]

4. [REDACTED] In response to the Directorate of Operations' report noted in paragraph three, CIA published a Senior Power Executive Intelligence Brief (SPWR) on 14 February 2002 that concluded, "Information on the alleged uranium contract between Iraq and Niger comes exclusively from a foreign government service report that lacks crucial details, and we are working to clarify the information and to determine whether it can be corroborated."

[REDACTED] The 14 February 2002 assessment erroneously stated the IAEA said Iraq already has some 550 tons of yellowcake—200 tons of which were purchased in 1978 from Niger. The correct figures are 199.9 tonnes of [REDACTED]

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5. [REDACTED] In early March 2002, the Directorate of Intelligence prepared an analytic update that reported on a meeting between the U.S. Ambassador to Niger, the Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the US European Command, and President Tandja of Niger. The update noted that in this late February 2002 meeting, President Tandja indicated that Niger was making all efforts to ensure that its uranium would be used only for peaceful purposes. We also reported that President Tandja had asked the US for unspecified assistance to ensure Niger's uranium did not fall into the wrong hands. Our analytic update also stated that we had requested additional information from the [REDACTED] service that provided the original reporting on this topic and that the service currently was unable to provide new information.

Joe Wilson

Wilton →

6. [REDACTED] On 8 March 2002, the Directorate of Operations disseminated information--obtained independently from a sensitive source--that indicated a former Nigerien government official claimed that since 1997, there had been no contracts signed between Niger and any rogue states for the sale of uranium in the form of yellowcake. While also asserting there had been no transfers of yellowcake to rogue states, one subsource--a former senior Nigerien official we are confident would have known of uranium sales--also said that he believed Iraq was interested in discussing yellowcake purchases when it sent a delegation to Niamey in mid-1999. The Directorate of Operations collected this information in an attempt to verify or refute [REDACTED] reporting on an alleged Iraq-Niger uranium deal. The Directorate of Operations assesses their sensitive source to be highly reliable [REDACTED]

The subsources, however, were described in the disseminated report as knowing their remarks could reach the US Government and noted these individuals may have intended their comments to influence as well as inform.

uranium contained in 276.8 tonnes of uranium yellowcake, which were imported in the early 1980s. The precise year of import of this material is in question as the IAEA indicates Iraq received 432 barrels of yellowcake (157,435 kgs total) from Niger in 1981. It also lists that in 1982, Iraq received another 426 barrels of the material (139,409 kgs total) from Niger, bringing the total to 276.8 tonnes. The Iraqi declaration from 7 December 2002, however, indicates that two shipments of yellowcake occurred on 8 February 1981 and 18 March 1981. These are the same dates noted by Iraq in one section of its 1998 "Full Final and Complete Declaration" on its nuclear program. These discrepancies in dates have been flagged to the Department of State.

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Trial	Control (n = 10)	MCI (n = 10)	AD (n = 10)
1	95	85	75
2	95	85	75
3	95	80	70
4	95	75	65
5	95	75	65

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information, however, was not shared with us.

9.

[REDACTED] In an effort to include all information related to Iraq's nuclear-weapon program, reports of attempts to acquire uranium from abroad were included in the NIE, but not as one of the reasons that most agencies judged that

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Saddam was reconstituting his nuclear weapons program. In 1991, State/INR noted later in the document that "the claims of Iraqi pursuit of natural uranium in Africa are, in INR's assessment, highly dubious."

11. [REDACTED] On 10 October 2002, Embassy Rome reported on a meeting from the previous day with a journalist from the Italian magazine *Panorama*. The journalist provided the Embassy with a copy of documents alleging Iraq and Niger had reached an agreement in July 2000 for the purchase of uranium. The journalist identified her source as an Italian male who had managed to obtain the documents in question and who was now seeking 15,000 Euro in return for their publication. Embassy Rome indicated that it had learned from CIA that the documents provided by the journalist were the subject of the CIA report issued on 5 February 2002, as described in paragraph three. Embassy Rome shared copies of the documents [REDACTED] which did not retain them because the Embassy forwarded the documents through State Department channels to its Bureau of Non-Proliferation (State/NP). The Directorate of Intelligence did not request or place a high-priority on obtaining the actual documents, at this time. [REDACTED]

12. [REDACTED] On 15 October 2002, an Intelligence Community E-mail (ICE-mail) from the Bureau of Intelligence and Research at the Department of State (State/INR) to CIA acknowledges receiving the documents acquired by Embassy Rome and noted doubt about the alleged uranium deal. State/INR also offered to provide copies of the documents to CIA at a meeting of the interagency group assigned to review nuclear export matters, occurring the next day. The delivery did not occur nor did CIA press State/INR for the documents, for the same reasons articulated in paragraph eleven.

13. [REDACTED] On 13 November 2002, as part of a larger briefing on the status of Iraq's nuclear weapons program, CIA briefed [REDACTED] "reporting on Iraqi attempts to procure uranium from Africa are fragmentary, at best. We assess that none of the deals have gone through, but it shows that Iraq is probably trying to acquire uranium ore abroad." Two additional points were provided which pointed to attempted uranium procurement from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DROC).

14. [REDACTED] On 22 November 2002, during a meeting at the State Department (INR), French Ministry of Foreign Affairs Director for Nonproliferation, Francois Richier, indicated France had drawn no conclusion about Iraqi nuclear reconstitution; and with one exception, the evidence available to France thus far was "dual-use." However, there was one thing "nuclear." France had information on an Iraqi attempt to buy uranium from Niger. Richier said France had investigated and determined that no uranium had been shipped. In response to a question from the

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Department of State as to whether France had confirmed that Iraq indeed had made this procurement attempt. Richier did not provide a direct response, but indicated that French officials believed this reporting to be true.

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27.

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2. [REDACTED] CIA received this information from the US Navy through standard military/attaché channels, i.e., JIR-series reporting.

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19. ██████████ A 17 January 2003 SPWR prepared in response to a request for additional evidence of Iraq's nuclear weapons program noted "Fragmentary reporting on Iraqi attempts to procure uranium from various countries in Africa in the past several years is another sign of reconstitution. Iraq has no legitimate use for uranium." Although CIA was re-examining this issue, this assessment reflected an extension of its previous analyses, because new data-such as a translation of the documents-had not yet arrived.

20. ██████████ In a 20 January 2003 ██████████ State/INR proposed adding points to the information ██████████ to be shared ██████████ on the Iraq-Niger uranium issue. The State/INR proposed talking points included details such as how the documents were acquired, but did not include any judgments concerning the authenticity of the documents. In the same message, State/INR also advocated that the actual documents obtained from Embassy Rome be passed to INVO. An exchange of ██████████ messages over the next few days shows ██████████ attempted to honor the State/INR requests. State/INR concurred in the final version of the talking points ██████████ which are described in more detail in paragraph twenty-five.

21. ██████████ January 2003, ██████████ issued a report ██████████ that noted that the presence of uranium is common in the port of Cotonou, Benin, as this is the terminus of the normal shipping route from Niger. ██████████ claimed ██████████ information related to discussions between Iraq and Niger dating from 1999 on a proposal to ship uranium. ██████████

22. ██████████
██████████

23. ██████████ On 29 January 2003, the President noted in the State of the Union address that, "...the British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa."

24. ██████████ On 4 February 2003, a note from CIA/WINPAC was sent to ██████████ the US Mission to the IAEA in Vienna and the United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) office in New York. The note contained copies of the original language documents obtained by Embassy Rome. Instructions in that note indicated the

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information could be passed to IAEA/INVO's Baute, which was interpreted as permission to pass the original documents. As a result, the original documents were passed to UNGOVIC who passed them to INVO.

25. [REDACTED] On 4-5 February 2003, the U.S. briefed INVO in response to Baute's request from 6 January for information on the alleged Iraq-Niger uranium agreement. Members of the US Mission to the IAEA in Vienna presented the information and analyses as compiled by CIA. This Intelligence Community-cleared briefing indicated, "Two streams of reporting suggest Iraq has attempted to acquire uranium from Niger. We cannot confirm these reports and have questions regarding some specific claims. Nonetheless, we are concerned that these reports may indicate Baghdad has attempted to secure an unreported source of uranium yellowcake for a nuclear weapons program." The two streams of reporting referred to in this briefing came from the sensitive source described in paragraph six of this notification [REDACTED] J
L

[REDACTED]

26. [REDACTED] During Secretary Powell's briefing to the UN Security Council on 5 February 2003, he did not mention attempted Iraqi procurement of uranium due to CIA concerns raised during coordination regarding the veracity of the information on the alleged Iraq-Niger Agreement.

27. [REDACTED] CIA/WINFAC received the translated documents from the State Department on 7 February 2003. A preliminary examination of the document confirmed the identities of a key Iraqi [REDACTED] but did not progress sufficiently to fully examine other claims in the document. Key forensic clues—errors in format and grammar contained in the original documents—were not conveyed in the translation process.

28. [REDACTED] On 10 February 2003, a US Defense Attaché Officer reported that he had examined the warehouses, as described by the reporting in paragraph fifteen, and found they contained cotton rather than barrels of uranium bound for Iraq.

29. [REDACTED] On 3 March 2003, IAEA/INVO [REDACTED] an analysis of the 17-page document that the U.S. provided on this issue. INVO's review concluded that these documents were forgeries and did not substantiate any assessment that Iraq sought to buy uranium from Niger. The IAEA noted their assessment was also based on interviews in Iraq and discussions with officials from Niger. Copies of the IAEA's assessment arrived at CIA Headquarters on 10 March 2003.

[REDACTED]

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30. ██████████ On 4 March 2003, the US Mission to the IAEA in Vienna reported that "Boute explained that the French based their initial assessment on the same documents that the US provided and that after further review by the French, they appeared to be "embarrassed" by their initial assessment."

31. (U) On 7 March 2003, IAEA Director General El Baradei stated in his report to the UN Security Council that day that documents provided by member states indicating that Iraq sought to buy uranium from Niger in recent years are "not authentic." The IAEA concluded that these specific allegations were unfounded and promised to follow up if additional evidence were provided by member states.

32. ██████████ An 11 March 2003 SPWR and memo concluded that "We do not dispute the IAEA Director General's conclusion--last Friday before the UN Security Council--that documents on Iraq's agreement to buy uranium from Niger are not authentic."

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Bates Numbers

001474-001481

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SECRET [REDACTED]

SUBJECT: [REDACTED] Purported Iraqi attempt to get Uranium from Niger

1. [REDACTED] Most agencies in the Intelligence Community (IC) assess that multiple intelligence reports over the last few years on Saddam's aggressive pursuit of aluminum tubes for centrifuges, magnets for centrifuge bearings, high-speed balancing machines, and computer-controlled machine tools as well as the reconsolidation of his cadre of nuclear technicians point to ongoing reconstitution of his nuclear weapons program. In addition to these reports, the IC received a number of reports alleging that Iraq attempted to get uranium from several countries. The reports on attempted uranium procurement were not the essential elements underpinning our judgment that reconstitution had begun. This point is underscored by the fact that in more than a dozen briefings to Congress by senior officials last fall, the uranium acquisition attempts were not briefed. Because this issue has gained so much public attention, especially after the IAEA's public announcement that the Niger documents were forgeries, the chronology below lays out the key events starting with the dissemination of the initial [REDACTED] report on the topic in October 2001.

2. [REDACTED] On 15 October 2001, the CIA's Directorate of Operations issued a report [REDACTED] that indicated as of early 2001, Niger planned to send several tons of uranium to Iraq. The agreement for the sale of uranium to Iraq reportedly was approved by the state court of Niger in 2000. [REDACTED]

3. [REDACTED] On 5 February 2002, the Directorate of Operations issued a second report [REDACTED] indicating Niger and Iraq had signed an agreement regarding the sale of uranium in July 2000. [REDACTED]

4. [REDACTED] In response to the Directorate of Operations' report noted in paragraph three, CIA published a Senior Power Executive Intelligence Brief (SPWR) on 14 February 2002 that concluded, "Information on the alleged uranium contract between Iraq and Niger comes exclusively from a foreign government service report that lacks crucial details, and we are working to clarify the information and to determine whether it can be corroborated."

[REDACTED] The 14 February 2002 assessment erroneously stated the IAEA said Iraq already has some 550 tons of yellowcake—200 tons of which were purchased in 1978 from Niger. The correct figures are 199.9 tonnes of [REDACTED]

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5. [REDACTED] In early March 2002, the Directorate of Intelligence prepared an analytic update that reported on a meeting between the U.S. Ambassador to Niger, the Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the US European Command, and President Tandja of Niger. The update noted that in this late February 2002 meeting, President Tandja indicated that Niger was making all efforts to ensure that its uranium would be used only for peaceful purposes. We also reported that President Tandja had asked the US for unspecified assistance to ensure Niger's uranium did not fall into the wrong hands. Our analytic update also stated that we had requested additional information from the [REDACTED] service that provided the original reporting on this topic and that the service currently was unable to provide new information.

6. [REDACTED] On 8 March 2002, the Directorate of Operations disseminated information--obtained independently from a sensitive source--that indicated a former Nigerien government official claimed that since 1997, there had been no contracts signed between Niger and any rogue states for the sale of uranium in the form of yellowcake. While also asserting there had been no transfers of yellowcake to rogue states, one subsorce--a former senior Nigerien official we are confident would have known of uranium sales--also said that he believed Iraq was interested in discussing yellowcake purchases when it sent a delegation to Niamey in mid-1999. The Directorate of Operations collected this information in an attempt to verify or refute.

[REDACTED] reporting on an alleged Iraq-Niger uranium deal. The Directorate of Operations assesses their sensitive source to be highly reliable [REDACTED]

The subsources, however, were described in the disseminated report as knowing their remarks could reach the US Government and noted these individuals may have intended their comments to influence as well as inform.

uranium contained in 276.8 tonnes of uranium yellowcake, which were imported in the early 1980s. The precise year of import of this material is in question as the IAEA indicates Iraq received 432 barrels of yellowcake (137,435 kgs total) from Niger in 1981. It also lists that in 1982, Iraq received another 426 barrels of the material (139,409 kgs total) from Niger, bringing the total to 276.8 tonnes. The Iraqi declaration from 7 December 2002, however, indicates that two shipments of yellowcake occurred on 8 February 1981 and 18 March 1981. These are the same dates noted by Iraq in one section of its 1998 "Full Final and Complete Declaration" on its nuclear program. These discrepancies in dates have been flagged to the Department of State.

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7. [REDACTED] On 25 March 2002, the Directorate of Operations released the third and final report on the Iraq-Niger uranium issue [REDACTED]

8. [REDACTED] On 24 September 2002, the British Government published a dossier titled "Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction," which stated that "...there is intelligence that Iraq has sought the supply of significant quantities of uranium from Africa." CIA avoided making a similar reference in providing text for the U.S. White Paper entitled "Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs" and expressed concerns about the credibility of the reporting to the British [REDACTED] prior to publication of their assessment.

[REDACTED] prior to publication of the dossier, the British countered CIA concerns regarding credibility of the reporting by claiming they had corroborating evidence that Iraq sought uranium from Africa. This alleged corroborating information, however, was not shared with us. [REDACTED]

9. [REDACTED]

On 4 October 2002, while testifying before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, CIA officers were asked whether they agreed with the British dossier on Iraq's weapons programs. CIA's National Intelligence Officer for Strategic and Nuclear Programs referenced two points on which the US differed from the British: [REDACTED]

10. [REDACTED] On 1 October 2002, the National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq's WMD program was published. It stated: "Iraq has about 550 metric tons of yellowcake and low-enriched uranium at Tuwaitha, which is inspected annually by the IAEA. Iraq also began vigorously trying to procure uranium ore and yellowcake; acquiring either would shorten the time Baghdad needs to produce nuclear weapons. A foreign government service reported that as of early 2001, Niger planned to send several tons of 'pure uranium' (probably yellowcake) to Iraq. As of early 2001, Niger and Iraq reportedly were still working out arrangement for this deal, which could be for up to 500 tons of yellowcake. [REDACTED]"

[REDACTED] In an effort to include all information related to Iraq's nuclear-weapon program, reports of attempts to acquire uranium from abroad were included in the NIE, but not as one of the reasons that most agencies judged that

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~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

Saddam was reconstituting his nuclear weapons program. In fact, State/INR noted later in the document that "the claims of Iraqi pursuit of natural uranium in Africa are, in INR's assessment, highly dubious."

11. [REDACTED] On 10 October 2002, Embassy Rome reported on a meeting from the previous day with a journalist from the Italian magazine *Panorama*. The journalist provided the Embassy with a copy of documents alleging Iraq and Niger had reached an agreement in July 2000 for the purchase of uranium. The journalist identified her source as an Italian male who had managed to obtain the documents in question and who was now seeking 15,000 Euro in return for their publication. Embassy Rome indicated that it had learned from CIA that the documents provided by the journalist were the subject of the CIA report issued on 5 February 2002, as described in paragraph three. Embassy Rome shared copies of the documents [REDACTED] which did not retain them because the Embassy forwarded the documents through State Department channels to its Bureau of Non-Proliferation (State/NP). The Directorate of Intelligence did not request or place a high-priority on obtaining the actual documents, at this time. [REDACTED]

12. [REDACTED] On 15 October 2002, an Intelligence Community E-mail (ICE-mail) from the Bureau of Intelligence and Research at the Department of State (State/INR) to CIA acknowledges receiving the documents acquired by Embassy Rome and noted doubt about the alleged uranium deal. State/INR also offered to provide copies of the documents to CIA at a meeting of the interagency group assigned to review nuclear export matters, occurring the next day. The delivery did not occur, nor did CIA press State/INR for the documents, for the same reasons articulated in paragraph eleven.

13. [REDACTED] On 13 November 2002, as part of a larger briefing on the status of Iraq's nuclear weapons program, CIA briefed [REDACTED] "reporting on Iraqi attempts to procure uranium from Africa are fragmentary, at best. We assess that none of the deals have gone through, but it shows that Iraq is probably trying to acquire uranium ore abroad." Two additional points were provided which pointed to attempted uranium procurement from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DROC).

14. [REDACTED] On 22 November 2002, during a meeting at the State Department (INR), French Ministry of Foreign Affairs Director for Nonproliferation, Francois Richier, indicated France had drawn no conclusion about Iraqi nuclear reconstitution; and with one exception, the evidence available to France thus far was "dual-use." However, there was one thing "nuclear," France had information on an Iraqi attempt to buy uranium from Niger. Richier said France had investigated and determined that no uranium had been shipped. In response to a question from the

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Department of State as to whether France had confirmed that Iraq indeed had made this procurement attempt. Richier did not provide a direct response, but indicated that French officials believed this reporting to be true.

15. [REDACTED] On 25 November 2002, the US Naval Criminal Investigation Service in Marseille, France reported information from two of its sources who claimed that a large quantity of uranium was currently stored in barrels at the Port of Cotonou, Benin and that Niger's President had sold this material to Iraq.

16. [REDACTED] On 19 December 2002, the State Department released a fact sheet illustrating omissions from the Iraqi declaration to the UN Security Council, prepared by State/MP. Under the nuclear weapons section it stated, "The declaration ignores efforts to procure uranium from Niger. Why is the Iraqi regime hiding their uranium procurement?" During coordination, CIA confirmed that of all the reported incidences of Iraqi efforts to acquire uranium from abroad since 1991, we had the most information concerning the alleged deal with Niger, yet still considered the overall reporting as fragmentary. That day, the Weapons center for Intelligence, Non-Proliferation, and Arms Control (WINPAC) in the Directorate of Intelligence recommended that Niger not be mentioned, but according to the State officer who drafted the fact sheet, our comments were not obtained in time to correct the listing on the State Department web site. The information was acted on in time, however, to remove it from Ambassador Negroponte's statement.

17. [REDACTED] a 6 January 2003 [REDACTED] IAEA's Iraq Nuclear Verification Office (INVO), INVO Director Jacques Baute raised the issue of uranium procurement attempts from Niger and requested that the U.S. provide any additional details regarding this supposed transaction. Baute added that INVO had not been provided with any particular details and, as in the past, asked for whatever information we could provide, however limited. In response, [REDACTED] began to review the reporting and analysis concerning the suspect Iraq-Niger Agreement [REDACTED]

18. [REDACTED] State/INR sent CIA two ICE-mail messages—one on 12 January and another on 13 January 2003—that expressed concerns that the documents pertaining to the Iraq-Niger deal were forgeries. In response, the WINPAC officer conducting a review of this issue discovered that CIA did not have a copy of those documents. The officer took steps to obtain the original [REDACTED] documents from State/INR, which occurred within days.

² [REDACTED] CIA received this information from the US Navy through standard military/attaché channels, i.e., JIR-series reporting.

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19. [REDACTED] A 17 January 2003 SPWR prepared in response to a request for additional evidence of Iraq's nuclear weapons program noted "Fragmentary reporting on Iraqi attempts to procure uranium from various countries in Africa in the past several years is another sign of reconstitution. Iraq has no legitimate use for uranium." Although CIA was re-examining this issue, this assessment reflected an extension of its previous analyses, because new data-such as a translation of the documents-had not yet arrived.

20. [REDACTED] In a 20 January 2003 [REDACTED] State/INR proposed adding points to the information [REDACTED] to be shared [REDACTED] on the Iraq-Niger uranium issue. The State/INR proposed talking points included details such as how the documents were acquired, but did not include any judgments concerning the authenticity of the documents. In the same message, State/INR also advocated that the actual documents obtained from Embassy Rome be passed to INVO. An exchange of [REDACTED] messages over the next few days shows [REDACTED] attempted to honor the State/INR requests. State/INR concurred in the final version of the talking points [REDACTED] which are described in more detail in paragraph twenty-five.

21. [REDACTED] January 2003, [REDACTED] issued a report [REDACTED] that noted that the presence of uranium is common in the port of Cotonou, Benin, as this is the terminus of the normal shipping route from Niger. [REDACTED] claimed [REDACTED] information related to discussions between Iraq and Niger dating from 1999 on a proposal to ship uranium. [REDACTED]

22. [REDACTED]

23. [REDACTED] On 29 January 2003, the President noted in the State of the Union address that, "the British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa."

24. [REDACTED] On 4 February 2003, a note from CIA/WINPAC was sent to [REDACTED] the US Mission to the IAEA in Vienna and the United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) office in New York. The note contained copies of the original language documents obtained by Embassy Rome. Instructions in that note indicated the

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information could be passed to IAEA/INVO's Baute, which was interpreted as permission to pass the original documents. As a result, the original documents were passed to UNMOVIC who passed them to INVO.

25. [REDACTED] On 4-5 February 2003, the U.S. briefed INVO in response to Baute's request from 6 January for information on the alleged Iraq-Niger uranium agreement. Members of the US Mission to the IAEA in Vienna presented the information and analyses as compiled by CIA. This Intelligence Community-cleared briefing indicated, "Two streams of reporting suggest Iraq has attempted to acquire uranium from Niger. We cannot confirm these reports and have questions regarding some specific claims. Nonetheless, we are concerned that these reports may indicate Baghdad has attempted to secure an unreported source of uranium yellowcake for a nuclear weapons program." The two streams of reporting referred to in this briefing came from the sensitive source described in paragraph six of this notification

[REDACTED]

26. [REDACTED] During Secretary Powell's briefing to the UN Security Council on 5 February 2003, he did not mention attempted Iraqi procurement of uranium due to CIA concerns raised during coordination regarding the veracity of the information on the alleged Iraq-Niger Agreement.

27. [REDACTED] CIA/WINFAC received the translated documents from the State Department on 7 February 2003. A preliminary examination of the document confirmed the identities of a key Iraqi [REDACTED] but did not progress sufficiently to fully examine other claims in the document. Key forensic clues—errors in format and grammar contained in the original documents—were not conveyed in the translation process.

28. [REDACTED] On 10 February 2003, a US Defense Attaché Officer reported that he had examined the warehouses, as described by the reporting in paragraph fifteen, and found they contained cotton rather than barrels of uranium bound for Iraq.

29. [REDACTED] On 3 March 2003, IAEA/INVO [REDACTED] an analysis of the 17-page document that the U.S. provided on this issue. INVO's review concluded that these documents were forgeries and did not substantiate any assessment that Iraq sought to buy uranium from Niger. The IAEA noted their assessment was also based on interviews in Iraq and discussions with officials from Niger. Copies of the IAEA's assessment arrived at CIA Headquarters on 10 March 2003.

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30. [REDACTED] On 4 March 2003, the US Mission to the IAEA in Vienna reported that "Baute explained that the French based their initial assessment on the same documents that the US provided and that after further review by the French, they appeared to be "embarrassed" by their initial assessment."

31. (U) On 7 March 2003, IAEA Director General El Baradei stated in his report to the UN Security Council that day that documents provided by member states indicating that Iraq sought to buy uranium from Niger in recent years are "not authentic." The IAEA concluded that these specific allegations were unfounded and promised to follow up if additional evidence were provided by member states.

32. [REDACTED] An 11 March 2003 SPWR and memo concluded that "We do not dispute the IAEA Director General's conclusion-last Friday before the UN Security Council-that documents on Iraq's agreement to buy uranium from Niger are not authentic."

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LL001-00508

Bates Number
001746

11/8/02

~~Phone calls to Armitage and~~
~~on Armenia~~

~~Threat to assassinate president (in show VP)~~

~~Cartoon did not transcribe ~~Robert~~ Franks, Muzaid and Rumsfeld --- transcript will be ready today.~~

~~Cleveland piece on Afghanistan (show VP)~~

~~John Hammet piece on Iranian visit to WH (show VP)~~

~~Neil piece on Turkish special forces (show VP)~~

~~W F SNP on TK~~

ST: Engine Treated as
TOP SECRET/SCI

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~~Klaas & Wilson~~

~~Successors to Taylor~~

Q

~~Y: UK not to be sure F.A. gets info to Erdogan~~

~~Y: Even Thomas on Imms~~

~~Y: too not CIA I printed - look Y request -~~

~~Longer AID~~

~~Y: 9/11 Cin~~

~~Y: 9/11 Cin~~

~~Y: get Karlen counting each argument - all back to anyone else's is a Karlen~~

~~Y: 9/11 Is Miller~~

~~Schmittor - Did VP "win and lose" Schmittor~~

~~for a demonstration~~

~~R. Karp on Slavery~~

~~Y: All practice Union from Mgr - 1?~~

001746

~~Foreign Leader~~

USG official

~~on a ...~~

LL005-09418

**Grand Jury
Exhibit 73**

**Bates Numbers
002881-002884**

7/21/03 David Sanger interview w/ Scooter for WMD
(PICKER + SHANGER)

^{CIA}
Analysts; NSC, Hadley; Powell; (Condi?)
[Tenet. NOT participating]

OTL But Sanger will clear begin quotes:

Powell presentation -

Sat screen msg:

DS: been described as more of legal case but
not

SL: meant to be chinese menu - in case
that one of them might not be used.

How long he wanted to speak - it was
Powell's decision

I thought more detailed would be useful -

DS: Are there topics not used by Powell
that you thought should have been used?

SL: too broad Q.

SL
DS: Up to Powell to make a choice of how
to present. He decided he wanted to
be shorter for # of reasons in case -

DS: 6 mos after both can't get same
story re Africa

002881

LL005-09444

SL - Niger

mirror 02 - report not poss of Iraq

Seeking yellowcake out of Africa

2/2 we asked - what are implications?

~~was~~ CIA had inquiries from State DOD

Situation Congo - SL will not confirm.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

002882

Why ~~not~~ included in SOTU? but not in Powell presentation?

Powell's people say never considered.
b/c. Tenet's people never believed it.
Agency thought there wasn't
enough sourcing.

URANIUM is small element of a decades
long care abt WMD. Not the most
impt element -

Sources
Demonstrating nuclear programs visited on

① yellowcake

② tubes

There was not a lot ~~the~~ in public domain
that demonstrated their reconstituting
nuclear program.

2 speeches - why incriminations sentence
removed.

VP/SL
CIA - trips to agency + others over course
seldom more than 1 hr.

Tenet/McLaughlin also in room
also on multiple subject) 002883

One more occasion - I went w/ Hadley
in connection w/ Powell presentation
to see if we cd find pictures etc


CUA

Powell - cd we have made better case
than ^{re: Al Qaeda connection} - better than just Zarqawi -

- very careful not to use operational
language - no suggestion working
planning together

Sr - Powell talks abt how Iraq provided
training for Al-Q

Sr - ^{now} cd have been more fully developed
find in Iraq w/ technical expertise



002884

LL005-09447

Bates Numbers

003644 & 003645

Siemers, Hannah

From: Siemers, Hannah
Sent: Tuesday, November 25, 2003 5:00 PM
To: Mayfield, Jennifer H.
Cc: Martin, Catherine J.; Kellems, Kevin
Subject: WSJ Editorial

Editorial: Yellowcake Remix (WSJ)

The Wall Street Journal

July 17, 2003

One of the mysteries of the recent yellowcake uranium flap is why the White House has been so defensive about an intelligence judgment that we don't yet know is false, and that the British still insist is true. Our puzzlement is even greater now that we've learned what last October's national intelligence estimate really said.

We're reliably told that that now famous NIE, which is meant to be the best summary judgment of the intelligence community, isn't nearly as full of doubt about that yellowcake story as the critics assert or as even CIA director George Tenet has suggested. The section on Iraq's hunt for uranium, for example, asserts bluntly that "Iraq also began vigorously trying to procure uranium ore and yellowcake" and that "acquiring either would shorten the time Baghdad needs to produce nuclear weapons."

Regarding the supposedly discredited Niger story, the NIE says that "A foreign government service reported that as of early 2001 Niger planned to send several tons of 'pure uranium' (probably yellowcake) to Iraq. As of early 2001, Niger and Iraq reportedly were still working out arrangements for this deal, which could be for up to 500 tons of yellowcake. We do not know the status of this arrangement."

That foreign government service is of course the British, who still stand by their intelligence. In the next paragraph, the NIE goes on to say that "Reports indicate Iraq also has sought uranium ore from Somalia and possibly the Democratic Republic of the Congo." It then adds that "We cannot confirm whether Iraq has succeeded in acquiring uranium ore and/or yellowcake from these sources."

This information, by the way, does not come from the White House, which to our mind has handled this story in ham-handed fashion. But we are told that language identical to what was in the NIE is what the CIA presented to the White House last January 24 in preparation for President Bush's State of the Union address.

As we interpret that NIE language, the President was entirely accurate in what he said in that speech about Saddam pursuing uranium in Africa. Mr. Tenet's carefully calibrated statement and disclosure last Friday accepting responsibility for this "mistake" was more tortured than warranted by the assertions in the NIE.

Keep in mind that NIEs are consensus documents. They aren't the view of some Lone Ranger analyst or a policy cabal. Our late great friend, strategist Albert Wohlstetter, disliked NIEs because he felt they often quashed alternative ways of looking at evidence. But faced with an intelligence community judgment like the one last October, what is an American President to do? Is he supposed to wait until we can prove beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law that some Iraqi agent has actually purchased the

1/28/2004

003644

LL002-03603

stuff?

The larger truth is that it was a deeply held consensus of the U.S. intelligence community that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction, including a nuclear weapons program. Multiple U.N. resolutions asserted the same thing. We had proof that Saddam had used chemical weapons in the past. The decision to disarm the Iraqi dictator wasn't based on a single intelligence report but on a mountain of evidence compiled over a dozen years.

Mr. Tenet appeared yesterday in a closed meeting of the Senate Intelligence Committee, which has also had access to the complete NIE since last October. In our view, the Committee could do a public service by releasing the entire NIE section on Iraq's uranium hunt, and for that matter on its WMD program, consistent with not compromising sources and methods. Americans could then make their own judgments about whether Mr. Bush was properly looking out for their security.

003645

1/28/2004

LL002-03604

Grand Jury

Exhibit 8

Have they done this sort of thing before?
Send an ambassador to answer a question?
Do we ordinarily send people out
pro bono to work for us?

THE NEW YORK TIMES OP-ED SUNDAY, JULY 6, 2003

WK 9

What I Didn't Find in Africa

By Joseph C. Wilson 4th

DURING the Bush administration, I was a career foreign service officer and ambassador. In 1990, as chargé d'affaires in Baghdad, I was the last American diplomat to meet with Saddam Hussein. (I was also a forceful advocate for his removal from Kuwait.) After Iraq, I was President George H.W. Bush's ambassador to Gabon and São Tomé and Príncipe; under President Bill Clinton, I helped direct Africa policy for the National Security Council.

Based on my experience with the administration in the months leading up to the war, I have little choice but to conclude that some of the intelligence related to Iraq's nuclear weapons program was twisted to exaggerate the Iraqi threat.

For 23 years, from 1976 to 1998, I was a career foreign service officer and ambassador. In 1990, as chargé d'affaires in Baghdad, I was the last American diplomat to meet with Saddam Hussein. (I was also a forceful advocate for his removal from Kuwait.) After Iraq, I was President George H.W. Bush's ambassador to Gabon and São Tomé and Príncipe; under President Bill Clinton, I helped direct Africa policy for the National Security Council.

It was my experience in Africa that led me to play a small role in the effort to verify information about Africa's suspected link to Iraq's nonconventional weapons programs. Those news stories about that unnamed former envoy who went to Niger? That's me.

In February 2002, I was informed by officials at the Central Intelligence Agency that Vice President Dick Cheney's office had questions about a particular intelligence report. While I never saw the report, I was told that it referred to a memorandum of agreement that documented the sale of uranium yellowcake — a form of lightly processed ore — by Niger to Iraq in the late 1990's. The agency officials asked if I would travel to Niger to check out

Joseph C. Wilson 4th, United States ambassador to Gabon from 1992 to 1995, is an international business consultant.

the story so they could provide a response to the vice president's office.

After consulting with the State Department's African Affairs Bureau (and through it with Barbro Owens-Kirkpatrick, the United States ambassador to Niger), I agreed to make the trip. The mission I undertook was discreet but by no means secret. While the C.I.A. paid my expenses (my time was

There was no Iraq-Niger uranium deal.

offered pro bono), I made it abundantly clear to everyone I met that I was acting on behalf of the United States government.

In late February 2002, I arrived in Niger's capital, Niamey, where I had been a diplomat in the mid-70's and visited as a National Security Council official in the late 80's. The city was much as I remembered it. Seasonal winds had clogged the air with dust and sand. Through the haze, I could see camel caravans crossing the Niger River (over the John F. Kennedy bridge), the setting sun behind them. Most people had wrapped scarves around their faces to protect against the grit, leaving only their eyes visible.

The next morning, I met with Ambassador Owens-Kirkpatrick at the embassy. For reasons that are understandable, the embassy staff has always kept a close eye on Niger's uranium business. I was not surprised, then, when the ambassador told me that she knew about the allegations of uranium sales to Iraq — and that she felt she had already debunked them in her reports to Washington. Nevertheless, she and I agreed that my time would be best spent interviewing people who had been in government when

the deal supposedly took place, which was before her arrival.

I spent the next eight days drinking sweet mint tea and meeting with dozens of people: current government officials, former government officials, people associated with the country's uranium business. It did not take long to conclude that it was highly doubtful that any such transaction had ever taken place.

Given the structure of the consortiums that operated the mines, it would be exceedingly difficult for Niger to transfer uranium to Iraq. Niger's main uranium mines — most of two mines, Somair and Cominak, which are run by French, Spanish, Japanese, German and Nigerian interests. If the government wanted to remove uranium from a mine, it would have to notify the consortium, which in turn is strictly monitored by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Moreover, because the two mines are closely regulated, quasi-governmental entities, selling uranium would require the approval of the minister of mines, the prime minister and probably the president. In short, there's simply too much oversight over too small an industry for a sale to have transpired.

(As for the actual memorandum, I never saw it. But news accounts have pointed out that the documents had glaring errors — they were signed, for example, by officials who were no longer in government — and were probably forged. And then there's the fact that Niger formally denied the charges.)

Before I left Niger, I briefed the ambassador on my findings, which were consistent with her own. I also shared my conclusions with members of her staff. In early March, I arrived in Washington and promptly provided a detailed briefing to the C.I.A. I later shared my conclusions with the State Department African Affairs Bureau. There was nothing secret or earth-shattering in my report, just as there was nothing secret about my trip.

Though I did not file a written report,

there should be at least four documents in United States government archives confirming my mission. The documents should include the ambassador's report of my debriefing in Niamey, a separate report written by the embassy staff, a C.I.A. report summarizing my trip, and a specific answer from the agency to the office of the vice president (this may have been delivered orally). While I have not seen any of these reports, I have spent enough time in government to know that this is standard operating procedure.

I thought the Niger matter was settled and went back to my life. (I did take part in the Iraq debate, arguing that a strict containment regime backed by the threat of force was preferable to an invasion.) In September 2002, however, Niger re-emerged. The British government published a "white paper" asserting that Saddam Hussein and his unconventional arms posed an immediate danger. As evidence, the report cited Iraq's attempts to purchase uranium from an African country.

Then, in January, President Bush, citing the British dossier, repeated the charges about Iraqi efforts to buy uranium from Africa.

The next day, I reminded a friend at the State Department of my trip and suggested that if the president had been referring to Niger, then his conclusion was not borne out by the facts as I understood them. He replied that perhaps the president was speaking about one of the other three African countries that produce uranium: Gabon, South Africa or Namibia. At the time, I accepted the explanation. I didn't know that in December, a month before the president's address, the State Department had published a fact sheet that mentioned the Niger case.

Those are the facts surrounding my efforts. The vice president's office asked a serious question: I was asked to help formulate the answer. I did so, and

I have every confidence that the answer I provided was circulated to the appropriate officials within our government.

The question now is how that answer was or was not used by our political leadership. If my information was deemed inaccurate, I understand (though I would be very interested to know why). If, however, the information was ignored because it did not fit certain preconceptions about Iraq, then a legitimate argument can be made that we went to war under false pretenses. (It's worth remembering that in his March "Meet the Press" appearance, Mr. Cheney said that Saddam Hussein was "trying once again to produce nuclear weapons.") At a minimum, Congress, which authorized the use of military force at the president's behest, should want to know if the assertions about Iraq were warranted.

I was convinced before the war that the threat of weapons of mass destruction in the hands of Saddam Hussein required a vigorous and sustained international response to disarm him. Iraq possessed and had used chemical weapons, it had an active biological weapons program and quite possibly a nuclear research program — all of which were in violation of United Nations resolutions. Having encountered Mr. Hussein and his thugs in the run-up to the Persian Gulf war of 1991, I was only too aware of the dangers he posed.

But were these dangers the same ones the administration told us about? We have to find out. America's foreign policy depends on the sanctity of its information. For this reason, questioning the selective use of intelligence to justify the war in Iraq is neither idle sniping nor "revisionist history," as Mr. Bush has suggested. The act of war is the last option of a democracy, taken when there is a grave threat to our national security. More than 200 American soldiers have lost their lives in Iraq already. We have a duty to ensure that their sacrifice came for the right reasons. □

MAUREEN DOWD

Ritalin For America

WASHINGTON

My mind was wandering the other day when I saw a TV ad that said I should see a mental health professional if my mind was wandering.

The ad said I might have Adult Attention Deficit Disorder. I did have a friend who got a diagnosis of A.A.D.D. His wife had complained he wasn't paying enough attention to her and sent him to a doctor, who prescribed Ritalin for spousal attention deficit disorder. My friend lost weight, became more focused on his work and left his complaining wife.

The law of unintended side effects. Ritalin abuse is rampant with children, as well as teenagers and college students, who like the extra stamina to study for exams, lose weight, ramp up performance to get in an Ivy League college or stay awake while getting drunk. When I grew up, there was no Ritalin; just a big gun with a ruler, warning you not to be "dreamy" or "a bold, brazen piece."

If you think about it, a lot of characters in literature probably had A.A.D.D. If Biff had been on Ritalin, he could have passed those math tests, and Willy Loman would not have got into the despondence that led to his fatal car crash. This gives new meaning to the maternal admonition, "Attention must be paid."

And what about Wife E. Coyote? That is one distracted doggie.

I went online to take "Dr. Grohol's Psych Central Adult A.D.D. Quiz." The questionnaire asked if "My moods have high and lows." Well, yes. It asked if "I am distressed by the

Attention must be paid —

to our empire.

disorganized way my brain works." You bet.

Reading over the questions, I realized America has A.A.D.D. The country has always had a pinball attention span, even before the Internet and cable TV accelerated it.

The New Republic recently had this "historical attention def-



Have they done this sort of thing before?
Send an Amb. to answer a question?
Do we ride happily round people out
pro bono to work for us?
Or did I

THE NEW YORK TIMES OP

What I Didn't Find

By Joseph C. Wilson 4th

DURING the Bush administration manipulate intelligence about Saddam Hussein's weapons programs to justify an invasion of Iraq?

Based on my experience with the administration in the months leading up to the war, I have little choice but to conclude that some of the intelligence related to Iraq's nuclear weapons program was twisted to exaggerate the Iraqi threat.

For 23 years, from 1976 to 1998, I was a career foreign service officer and ambassador. In 1990, as charge d'affaires in Baghdad, I was the last American diplomat to meet with Saddam Hussein. (I was also a forceful advocate for his removal from Kuwait.) After Iraq, I was President George H. W. Bush's ambassador to Gabon and São Tomé and Príncipe, under President Bill Clinton, I helped direct Africa policy for the National Security Council.

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the story so they could provide a response to the vice president's office.

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There was no Iraq-Niger uranium deal.

offered pro bono) I made it abundantly clear to everyone I met that I was acting on behalf of the United States government.

In late February 2002, I arrived in Niger's capital, Niamey, where I had been a diplomat in the mid-70's and visited as a National Security Council official in the late 90's. The city was much as I remembered it. Seasonal winds had clogged the air with dust and sand. Through the haze, I could see camel caravans crossing the Niger River (over the John F. Kennedy bridge), the setting sun behind them. Most people had wrapped scarves around their faces to protect against the grit leaving only their eyes visible.

The next morning, I met with Ambassador Owens-Kirkpatrick at the embassy. For reasons that are understandable, the embassy staff has always kept a close eye on Niger's uranium business. I was not surprised, then, when the ambassador told me that she knew about the allegations of uranium sales to Iraq — and that she felt she had already debunked them in her reports to Washington. Nevertheless, she and I agreed that my time would be best spent interviewing people who had been in government when

the deal supposedly took place, which was before her arrival.

I spent the next eight days drinking sweet mint tea and meeting with dozens of people: current government officials, former government officials, people associated with the country's uranium business. It did not take long to conclude that it was highly doubtful that any such transaction had ever taken place.

Given the structure of the consortiums that operated the mines, it would be exceedingly difficult for Niger to transfer uranium to Iraq. Niger's uranium business consists of two mines, Somair and Cominak, which are run by French, Spanish, Japanese, German and Nigerian interests. If the government wanted to remove uranium from a mine, it would have to notify the consortium, which in turn is strictly monitored by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Moreover, because the two mines are closely regulated, quasi-governmental entities, selling uranium would require the approval of the minister of mines, the prime minister, and probably the president. In short, there's simply too much oversight over too small an industry for a sale to have transpired.

(As for the actual memorandum, I never saw it. But news accounts have pointed out that the documents had glaring errors — they were signed, for example, by officials who were no longer in government — and were probably forged. And then there's the fact that Niger formally denied the charges.)

Before I left Niger, I briefed the ambassador on my findings, which were consistent with her own. I also shared my conclusions with members of her staff. In early March, I arrived in Washington and promptly provided a detailed briefing to the C.I.A. I later shared my conclusions with the State Department African Affairs Bureau. There was nothing secret or earth-shattering in my report, just as there was nothing secret about my trip.

Though I did not file a written report

Joseph C. Wilson 4th, United States ambassador to Gabon from 1992 to 1995, is an international business consultant.

001595

in Africa

there should be at least four documents in United States government archives confirming my mission. The documents should include: the ambassador's report of my debriefing in Niamey; a separate report written by the embassy staff; a CIA report summing up my trip; and a specific answer from the agency to the office of the vice president (this may have been delivered orally). While I have not seen any of these reports, I have spent enough time in government to know that this is standard operating procedure.

I thought the Niger matter was settled and went back to my life. (I did take part in the Iraq debate, arguing that a "strict containment regime backed by the threat of force was preferable to an invasion.") In September 2002, however, Niger re-emerged. The British government published a "white paper" asserting that Saddam Hussein and his unconventional arms posed an immediate danger. As evidence, the report cited Iraq's attempts to purchase uranium from an African country.

Then, in January, President Bush, citing the British dossier, repeated the charges about Iraqi efforts to buy uranium from Africa.

The next day, I reminded a friend at the State Department of my trip and suggested that if the president had been referring to Niger, then his conclusion was not borne out by the facts as I understood them. He replied that perhaps the president was speaking about one of the other three African countries that produce uranium: Gabon, South Africa or Namibia. At the time, I accepted the explanation. I didn't know that in December, a month before the president's address, the State Department had published a fact sheet that mentioned the Niger case.

Those are the facts surrounding my efforts. The vice president's office asked a serious question. I was asked to help formulate the answer. I did so, and

I have every confidence that the answer I provided was circulated to the appropriate officials within our government.

The question now is how that answer was or was not used by our political leadership. If my information was deemed inaccurate, I understand (though I would be very interested to know why). If, however, the information was ignored because it did not fit certain preconceptions about Iraq, then a legitimate argument can be made that we went to war under false pretenses. (It's worth remembering that in his March "Meet the Press" appearance, Mr. Cheney said that Saddam Hussein was "trying once again to produce nuclear weapons.") At a minimum, Congress, which authorized the use of military force at the president's behest, should want to know if the assertions about Iraq were warranted.

I was convinced before the war that the threat of weapons of mass destruction in the hands of Saddam Hussein required a vigorous and sustained international response to disarm him. Iraq possessed and had used chemical weapons; it had an active biological weapons program and quite possibly a nuclear research program — all of which were in violation of United Nations resolutions. Having encountered Mr. Hussein and his thugs in the run-up to the Persian Gulf war of 1991, I was only too aware of the dangers he posed.

But were these dangers the same ones the administration told us about? We have to find out. America's foreign policy depends on the sanctity of its information. For this reason, questioning the selective use of intelligence to justify the war in Iraq is neither idle sniping nor "revisionist history," as Mr. Bush has suggested. The act of war is the last option of a democracy, taken when there is a grave threat to our national security. More than 200 American soldiers have lost their lives in Iraq already. We have a duty to ensure that their sacrifice came for the right reasons. □

MAUREEN DOWD

Ritalin For America

WASHINGTON

My mind was wandering the other day when I saw a TV ad that said I should see a mental health professional if my mind was wandering.

The ad said I might have Adult Attention Deficit Disorder. I did have a friend who got a diagnosis of A.A.D.D. His wife had complained he wasn't paying enough attention to her and sent him to a doctor, who prescribed Ritalin for spousal attention deficit disorder. My friend lost weight, became more focused on his work and left his complaining wife.

The law of unintended side effects. Ritalin abuse is rampant with children, as well as teenagers and college students, who like the extra stamina to study for exams, lose weight, ramp up performance to get in an Ivy League college or stay awake while getting drunk. When I grew up, there was no Ritalin, just a big nun with a ruler, warning you not to be "dreamy" or "a bold, brazen piece."

If you think about it, a lot of characters in literature probably had A.A.D.D. If Biff had been on Ritalin, he could have passed those math tests, and Willy Loman would not have got into the despondence that led to his fatal car crash. This gives new meaning to the maternal admonition, "Attention must be paid."

And what about Wile E. Coyote? That is one distracted doggie.

I went online to take "Dr. Grohol's Psych Central Adult A.D.D. Quiz." The questionnaire asked if "My moods have high and lows." Well, yes. It asked if "I am distressed by the

Attention must be paid —

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disorganized way my mind works.
You bet.
Reading over the

Bates Numbers

001528-001532

DECLASSIFIED

Analyzing the Iraq-Niger controversy
involving the State of the Union

THE VICE PRESIDENT
HAS SEEN

SUMMARY

Key documents written by the Intelligence Community in late 2002 and early 2003 show that the White House would have been reasonable in believing prior to the State of the Union Address that Iraq had sought uranium from Africa. In fact, these documents show that, only days before the speech, the Intelligence Community stood behind its judgment that, "Iraq began to vigorously attempt to procure uranium" from Africa.

These documents include relevant sections of the Intelligence Community's October 2002 NIE and a CIA submission to the White House on January 24, 2003. Both contain the flat assertion that Iraq was vigorously attempting to procure uranium, and cite examples from Africa. In addition, the report of Amb. Joe Wilson has been distorted by the press and Mr. Wilson.

None of these documents have been declassified and presented fairly to the public. But less probative oral discussions and inferences have been readily thrown about. This should be corrected

The Problem. Recent leaks, Director Tenet's July 11 public statement, Amb. Joe Wilson's claims and the media have left the public with the misimpression that the Intelligence Community was expressing widespread doubts about the Iraq-African uranium connection before the State of the Union. From this, some assert that the President or Vice President knew or should have known about these doubts before the President delivered the speech.

The Truth. The complete record -- including especially the written record -- shows that the CIA was communicating directly to the President, Vice President, and other Senior White House officials that the Intelligence Community credited the reports of the Iraq-African connection.

1. THE OCTOBER 2002 NIE FLATLY ASSERTS THAT IRAQ WAS VIGOROUSLY TRYING TO OBTAIN URANIUM. The 1 October 2002 NIE

DECLASSIFIED

OVP Staff Secretary Received

7/18/03

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LL010-10487

includes (at pages 24-5) a section entitled "Uranium Acquisition" (see attached) that states without reservation:

"Iraq also began vigorously trying to procure uranium ore and yellowcake; acquiring either would shorten the time Baghdad needs to produce a nuclear weapon."
(emphasis added.)

This is presented as a flat assertion by the NIE, not as a summary of the reports which are then cited in bullet form. The reports which are cited include the Niger story and reports involving Somalia and possibly the Congo. The NIE's phrase "vigorously trying to pursue" is not in the Niger reports (the others are not yet available to us.) The reader cannot know whether there are additional reports not cited, for example because they are too sensitive for a report as widely circulated as the NIE.

a. Limited Disclaimers: In citing the Niger reports, the NIE contains three disclaimers, which do not refute the statement of the Intelligence Community that Iraq was "vigorously trying to procure uranium."

i. The first disclaimer states, "We do not know the status of [the Niger] arrangement." This does not question Iraq's intent to procure, which is the President's statement in the State of the Union address.

ii. Similarly, the NIE states that, "We cannot confirm whether Iraq succeeded in acquiring uranium from these [African] sources...", but does not question Iraq's intent to procure.

iii. The third is an INR disclaimer that finds the reports of Iraq's attempt to procure uranium "highly dubious." ~~This disclaimer is not cited or footnoted in the text on Uranium Acquisition, but appears in an appendix on a different issue (aluminum tubes) 60 pages later.~~ Notably, no other agency expresses doubt about the NIE assertion that Iraq is "vigorously trying to pursue" uranium. Therefore, policymakers would conclude that the CIA and other lead agencies did not share the INR doubts, even after hearing INR's views.

b. Director Tenet's July 11, 2003 written statement quotes these three disclaimers in full, but fails to quote in

full the key NIE sentence: "Iraq also began vigorously trying to procure uranium...."

Instead, the Director's statement characterizes the sentence so that it appears to be something stated in the underlying reporting, rather than an NIE assertion. The Director writes that, "These paragraphs also cited reports that Iraq began "vigorously trying to procure" more uranium from Niger and two other African countries...." But the NIE language is presented as a flat assertion by the NIE, not as a citation of reports. The phrase "vigorously trying to procure" does not, to our knowledge, appear anywhere in the cited reports.

2. FOUR DAYS BEFORE THE STATE OF THE UNION, THE CIA RESENT TO THE WHITE HOUSE THE NIE'S FLAT ASSERTION THAT IRAQ WAS "VIGOROUSLY TRYING TO PROCURE URANIUM."

Late on January 24, the CIA sent to the White House a five page paper entitled, "The following information responds to your requests for additional details regarding our input to the case for Saddam possessing weapons of mass destruction." This report, which was sent to inform White House efforts, including most notably Secretary Powell's upcoming UN presentation, arrived at the White House only four days before the State of the Union. The CIA's January 24 paper includes virtually verbatim the "Uranium Acquisition" section of the NIE.

Notably, it includes verbatim the NIE's flat assertion that, "Iraq also began vigorously trying to procure uranium...." and the African examples.

There is no INR disclaimer in this January 24, 2003 report. In fact, two weeks earlier the State Department had issued a white paper that cited the Iraqi attempts to procure Uranium from Niger as proof that the Iraqi Declaration under UNSCR 1441 was false.

Director Tenet's July 11 statement and recent leaks do not refer to this January 24 written submission to the White House, leaving an incomplete record. Instead, the Director and recent leaks refer to other sources that appear not to have reached top policy makers and that do not carry the same weight as the Intelligence Community's NIE and the CIA's January 24 written submission to the White House, only days before the speech.

a. Director Tenet's statement cites an oral conversation between CIA and NSC staffers shortly before the State of the Union, but not the equally or more authoritative January 24 submission that was sent by the CIA officer responsible for the NIE, that reached some or all of these same NSC staffers within two days of the oral discussion, and that reaffirmed the Intelligence Community's conclusions in the NIE.

b. Similarly, recent leaks refer to oral conversations between the Director and Deputy National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley around the President's October 7 Cincinnati speech, but not to the fact that the January 24 submission was addressed to Mr. Hadley and circulated to key White House staff only days before the State of the Union.

c. The Director's statement refers to discussions [REDACTED] that are not shown to have come to the attention of top policymakers, while the British white paper and the CIA's January 24 submission did.

d. The Director's statement refers to oral briefings of hundreds of members of Congress in the fall of 2002 that did not include the uranium story, but not the CIA's written January 24 submission to the White House which specifically addressed uranium, which is at least as relevant.

e. The Director's statement seems to suggest that his omission of the uranium story in his briefings to the Congress and elsewhere should lead one to conclude that he had doubts about the intelligence. But CIA doubts do not appear in the NIE issued to Congress in that period. Moreover, the Director's July 11 statement also notes that "Let me emphasize, the NIE's key judgments cited six reasons for this assessment [that Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear program]; the African uranium was not one of them." Thus, even if the White House had focused on what the Director was omitting from his briefings, it would be equally plausible to infer that the uranium simply was not important enough for the brief time available.

3. THE CIA CABLE SUMMARIZING AMB. JOE WILSON'S REPORT OF HIS TRIP TO NIGER SHOWS THAT HE DID NOT DEBUNK THE CLAIM OF AN IRAQ-AFRICAN CONNECTION, AS SOME CLAIM. Some cite the report of Amb. Joe Wilson's trip to Niger to support an assertion or inference that the President or Vice President knew that the Iraq-African uranium connection was questionable. But, as Director Tenet's July 11 statement notes, the trip was not

requested by the Vice President, was not reported to the President or Vice President or other senior policymakers, and the report on Amb. Wilson's trip on its face supported, rather than debunking the claims of an Iraqi procurement effort in Africa.

Moreover, the Wilson trip report (March 2002) preceded by more than six months the October 2002 NIE and the January 24, 2003 CIA submission to the White House. These documents, which reflect not a single report but the consensus position of the Intelligence Community, flatly assert that Iraq was "vigorously trying to procure uranium." So even if a policymaker had reviewed the report of Wilson's trip, it would have been discounted.

4. The October NIE shows "High Confidence" in the Intelligence Community's judgment that "Iraq is continuing, and in some areas expanding, its chemical, biological, nuclear and missile programs contrary to UN Resolutions. (At page 9.)

Bates Number
001801

The Vice President and I did not request the Wilson Trip and did not know about it or any report on his trip until June 2003, well after the State of the Union. As Director Tenet's July 11, 2003 statement made clear, the report of Ambassador Wilson's trip was not conclusive, and in fact contained material that would lend support to Iraq trying to procure uranium.

The Vice President and I were not part of the drafting of sections in the State of the Union addressing Iraq and Weapons of Mass destruction.

The Vice President and I were not part of and, prior to the State of the Union, did not know about the content of discussions between CIA and NSC personnel immediately before the State of the Union referred to in Director Tenet's July 11 statement, or the content of any discussions reported in the press to have been held between Director Tenet and Deputy National Security Adviser Tenet on or about the time of the President's October 7 speech.

The Vice President and I were aware of written Intelligence Community reports circulated in days and months prior to the State of the Union. Those reports support the statements in the State of the Union.

001801

**Grand Jury
Exhibit 69**

**Bates Number
001798**

Talking Points

FALSE ALLEGATION: (Hardball 7/14)

MATTHEWS: Well, a couple of points of interest, I think, are, first of all, that the vice president's office asked the CIA to send somebody down to Niger and check on this case.

② They obviously reported back, so the vice president's office, which is headed by Scooter Libby, who is a foreign policy expert and an advocate of the war, I think it's fair to say --
③ why didn't he inform the president, inform him, go tell the president he shouldn't have said this? Forget about who put it in the speech. Why didn't he aggressively say, this shouldn't be in there.

④ Not
⑤ Secondly, Steven Hadley was told by George Tenet of the CIA, that this information was bogus. Why didn't he correct it on behalf of the president?

FINEMAN: Well, I think there was definitely both political and administrative momentum inside the White House at the time from the vice president's office. Probably from parts of the Defense Department that overrode whatever cautionary signs there might have been, and said we have to make the case that not only we should go to Iraq, but that we need to go to Iraq now. I mean, these -- these things that were in the speech, Chris, are important because they went to the question of why America needed to invade now.

RESPONSE

- The Vice President's office did not request Joe Wilson's trip to Niger. As Director Tenet said in his statement on Friday, the CIA sent Wilson to Niger on its own volition. It was not in response to a specific request by the Vice President's office.

CITE TO ARI GAGGLE FROM 7/7

Q Can you give us the White House account of Ambassador Wilson's account of what happened when he went to Niger and investigated the suggestions that Niger was passing yellow cake to Iraq? I'm sure you saw the piece yesterday in The New York Times.

MR. FLEISCHER: Well, there is zero, nada, nothing new here. Ambassador Wilson, other than the fact that now people know his name, has said all this before. But the fact of the matter is in his statements about the Vice President -- the Vice President's office did not request the mission to Niger. The Vice President's office was not informed of his mission and he was not aware of Mr. Wilson's mission until recent press accounts -- press reports accounted for it.

So this was something that the CIA undertook as part of their regular review of events, where they sent him. But they sent him on their own

**Grand Jury
Exhibit 70**

**Bates Numbers
004846-004848**

FBI Agents Tracing Linkage Of Envoy To CIA Operative

The Washington Post
By Walter Pincus and Mike Allen
October 12, 2003

WASHINGTON, DC -- FBI agents investigating the disclosure of a CIA officer's identity have begun by examining events in the month before the leak, when the CIA, the White House and Vice President Cheney's office first were asked about former ambassador Joseph C. Wilson IV's CIA-sponsored trip to Niger, according to sources familiar with the probe.

The name of Wilson's wife, Valerie Plame, a clandestine case officer, was revealed in a July 14 column by Robert D. Novak that quoted two unidentified senior administration officials. In their interviews, FBI agents are asking questions about events going back to at least early June, the sources said. That indicates investigators are examining not just who passed the information to Novak and other reporters but also how Plame's name may have first become linked with Wilson and his mission, who did it and how the information made its way around the government. Administration sources said they believe the officials who discussed Plame were not trying to expose her, but were using the information as a tool to try to persuade reporters to ignore Wilson. The officials wanted to convince the reporters that he had benefited from nepotism in being chosen for the mission.

What started as political gossip and damage control has become a major criminal investigation that has already harmed the administration and could be a problem for President Bush for months to come. One reason investigators are looking back is that even before Novak's column appeared, government officials had been trying for more than a month to convince journalists that Wilson's mission was not as important as it was being portrayed. Wilson concluded during the 2002 mission that there was no solid evidence for the administration's assertion that Iraq was trying to acquire uranium in Niger to develop nuclear weapons, and he angered the White House when he became an outspoken critic of the war. The FBI is trying to determine when White House officials and members of the vice president's staff first focused on Wilson and learned about his wife's employment at the agency.

One group that may have known of the connection before that time is the handful of CIA officers detailed to the White House, where they work primarily on the National Security Council staff. A former NSC staff member said one or more of those officers may have been aware of the Plame-Wilson relationship. White House press secretary Scott McClellan said in response to a query for this article: "I think it would be counterproductive during an ongoing investigation for me to chase rumors and speculation. The president has directed the White House to cooperate fully, and that is exactly what we are doing." Investigators are trying to establish the chain of events leading to the leak because, for a successful prosecution under the law prohibiting unauthorized disclosure of a covert U.S. officer's name, the disclosure must have been intentional, the accused must have known the person was a covert officer and the identity must not have been disclosed earlier.

The first public mention of Wilson's mission to Niger, albeit without identifying him by name, was in the New York Times on May 6, in a column by Nicholas D. Kristof. Kristof had been on a panel with Wilson four days earlier, when the former ambassador said State Department officials should know better than to say the United States had been duped by forged documents that allegedly had proved a deal for the uranium had been in the works between Iraq and Niger. Wilson said he told Kristof about his trip to Niger on the condition that Kristof must keep his name out of the column. When the column appeared, it created little public stir, though it set a number of reporters on the trail of the anonymous former ambassador. Kristof confirmed that account. The column mentioned the alleged role of the vice president's office for the first time.

That was when Cheney aides became aware of Wilson's mission and they began asking questions about

him within the government, according to an administration official. In the meantime, Wilson was pressing his case. He briefed two congressional committees conducting inquiries into why the president had mentioned the uranium allegation in his Jan. 28 State of the Union address. He also began making frequent television appearances. In early June, Wilson told his story to The Washington Post on the condition that his name be withheld. On June 12, The Post published a more complete account than Kristof's of Wilson's trip. Wilson has now given permission to The Post to identify him as one source for that article. By that time, officials in the White House, Cheney's office, the CIA and the State Department were familiar with Wilson and his mission to Niger.

Starting that week, the officials repeatedly played down the importance of Wilson's trip and its findings, saying it had been authorized within the CIA's nonproliferation section at a low level without requiring the approval of senior agency officials. No one brought up Wilson's wife, and her employment at the agency was not known at the time the article was published. Wilson's oral report to a CIA officer had been turned into a routine one-and-a-half page CIA intelligence memo to the White House and other agencies. By tradition, his identity as the source, even though he went under the auspices of the CIA, was not disclosed. "This gent made a visit to the region and chatted up his friends," a senior intelligence official said last June in describing the agency's view of the mission.

Regarding the allegation about Iraq seeking uranium, the official said: "He relayed back to us that they said it was not true and that he believed them." The Post article generated little public response. But behind the scenes, Bush officials were concerned. "After the June story, a lot of people in government were scurrying around asking who is this envoy and why is he saying these things," a senior administration official said. Wilson said he attempted to increase pressure on the White House the day after the June 12 article was published by calling some present and former senior administration officials who know national security adviser Condoleezza Rice. He wanted them to tell Rice that she was wrong in her comment on NBC's "Meet the Press" on June 8 that there may be some intelligence "in the bowels of the agency," but that no one around her had any doubts about the uranium story.

Wilson said those officials told him Rice was not interested and he should publish his story in his own name if he wanted to attract attention. On July 6, Wilson went public. In an interview published in The Post, Wilson accused the administration of "misrepresenting the facts on an issue that was a fundamental justification for going to war." In an opinion article the same day in the New York Times, he wrote that "some of the intelligence related to Iraq's nuclear weapons program was twisted to exaggerate the Iraqi threat." On "Meet the Press" that day, Wilson said: "Either the administration has some information that it has not shared with the public or, yes, they were using the selective use of facts and intelligence to bolster a decision in the case that had already been made, a decision that had been made to go war." On July 7, the White House admitted it had been a mistake to include the 16 words about uranium in Bush's State of the Union speech.

Four days later, with the controversy dominating the airwaves and drowning out the messages Bush intended to send during his trip in Africa, CIA Director George J. Tenet took public blame for failing to have the sentence removed. That same week, two top White House officials disclosed Plame's identity to at least six Washington journalists, an administration official told The Post for an article published Sept. 28. The source elaborated on the conversations last week, saying that officials brought up Plame as part of their broader case against Wilson. "It was unsolicited," the source said. "They were pushing back. They used everything they had." Novak has said he began interviewing Bush officials about Wilson shortly after July 6, asking why such an outspoken Bush policy critic was picked for the Niger mission.

Novak reported that Wilson's wife worked at the CIA on weapons of mass destruction and that she was the person who suggested Wilson for the job. Officials have said Wilson, a former ambassador to Gabon and National Security Council senior director for African affairs, was not chosen because of his wife. On July 12, two days before Novak's column, a Post reporter was told by an administration official that the White House had not paid attention to the former ambassador's CIA-sponsored trip to

004847

Niger because it was set up as a boondoggle by his wife, an analyst with the agency working on weapons of mass destruction. Plame's name was never mentioned and the purpose of the disclosure did not appear to be to generate an article, but rather to undermine Wilson's report.

After Novak's column appeared, several high-profile reporters told Wilson that they had received calls from White House officials drawing attention to his wife's role. Andrea Mitchell of NBC News said she received one of those calls. Wilson said another reporter called him on July 21 and said he had just hung up with Bush's senior adviser, Karl Rove. The reporter quoted Rove as describing Wilson's wife "fair game," Wilson said. Newsweek has identified that reporter as MSNBC television host Chris Matthews. Spokespeople said Matthews was unavailable for comment. McClellan, the White House spokesman, has denied that Rove was involved in leaking classified material but has refused to discuss the possibility of a campaign to call attention to the revelations in Novak's column.

On July 17, the Time magazine Web site reported that "some government officials have noted to Time in interviews, (as well as to syndicated columnist Robert Novak) that Wilson's wife, Valerie Plame, is a CIA official who monitors the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction." On July 22, Wilson appeared on NBC's "Today" show and said that disclosing the name of a U.S. intelligence officer would be "a breach of national security," could compromise that officer's entire network of contacts and could be a violation of federal law. Wilson said that brought an immediate halt to the reports he had been getting of anonymous attacks on him by White House officials. An administration source said, "One of the greatest mysteries in all this is what was really the rationale for doing it and doing it this way."

004848

LL001-00277

**Grand Jury
Exhibit 71**

**Bates Number
003754**

Martin, Catherine J.

From: Mayfield, Jennifer H.
Sent: Tuesday, September 30, 2003 12:15 PM
To: Martin, Catherine J.
Cc: Lawrimore, Emily A.
Subject: From the ABC Note

Scooter wanted to make sure that you saw the below.

"An article that appeared on the Time magazine Web site the same week Novak's column was published said that 'some government officials have noted to Time in interviews . . . that Wilson's wife, Valerie Plame, is a CIA official who monitors the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.' The same article quoted from an interview with I. Lewis Libby, Vice President Cheney's chief of staff, saying that Cheney did not know about Wilson's mission 'until this year when it became public in the last month or so.'"

One obvious implication of this is that the oft-press shy Libby was taking journalists' calls during the period when Plame's name was named, but, of course, that doesn't mean that Libby had anything to do with it.

Of course, the *Post* printing that pretty much non-sequitariat paragraph COULD suggest two things:

A. The *Post* has its suspicions

B. Maybe Mr. Libby should have played nicer with the intel boys during the run-up to the Iraq war

The Time.com story is also interesting because it demonstrates the clear animus that the administration felt toward Wilson contemporaneously with the leak of the name:

" . . . Administration officials have taken public and private whacks at Wilson, charging that his 2002 report, made at the behest of U.S. intelligence, was faulty and that his mission was a scheme cooked up by mid-level operatives" [LINK](#)

"George Tenet, the director of the Central Intelligence Agency, took a shot at Wilson last week as did ex-White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer. Both contended that Wilson's report on an alleged Iraqi effort to purchase uranium from Niger, far from undermining the president's claim in his State of the Union address that Iraq sought uranium in Africa, as Wilson had said, actually strengthened it."

And we really don't like to fight with Bob Novak — besides being a fellow journalist and Terps fan, he is our hero. . . .

But we don't understand why

1. Bob thinks it matters that he was told the name of Wilson's wife in a conversation he initiated, as he claimed yesterday. It is a classic political hit strategy, Bob, to take the call from the reporter, and work the negative information into the call.

2. Newsday quoted Bob on July 22 saying, "his sources had come to him with the information. 'I didn't dig it out, it was given to me,' he said. "They thought it was significant, they gave me the name and I used it." [LINK](#)

1/23/2004

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LL001-00098

**Grand Jury
Exhibit 72**

**Bates Number
002518**

THE VICE PRESIDENT
HAS SEEN

[People have made too much of the difference in
how I described Karl and Libby]

I've talked to Libby.

I said it was ridiculous about Karl
and it is ridiculous about Libby
Libby was not the source of the Novak
story.

And he did not leak classified information.

Torrey
Wilson
memo.

Has to happen today

Call out to key press saying same thing
about Scotter as Karl

Not going to protect our staffer & sacrifice
the guy ~~that was~~ that was asked to stick
his neck in the meat grinder because of the
incompetence of others -

002518
LL001-00099